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Nogales: NAFTA Environmental Framework

THE NAFTA ENVIRONMENTAL
FRAMEWORK, CHAPTER 11
INVESTMENT PROVISIONS,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
FRANCISCO S. NOGALES'

Hurt not the earth, neither the sea, nor the trees.
- Revelation 7:3
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the period since 1989, international markets have become more
integrated than ever before, and economic prospects of individual
countries have become - more than ever before - bound up in the fate of
the world economy.' Globalization should have a positive effect on the
global and national economies according to the theory of comparative
advantage, where each country produces and exports only those products
that it can most efficiently produce compared to other nations.
Consequently, efficient production should result in better use of national
and world resources, ultimately leading to improved economies, lower
prices for consumers, and overall benefits for the world in general. The

* I would like to thank three Golden Gate University School of Law professors for assisting
with this paper: Professor Helen Hartnell for helping me define the scope of the paper; Professor
Paul KibeI for providing me with important and timely information that was utilized extensively in
the paper; and most of all, Professor Armin Rosencranz for enlightening me, guiding me, and
motivating me to reach this very important personal goal - to have this paper published. Lastly, I
would like to thank the entire GGU International Legal Studies department for the opportunities that
they provided me and the lifelong lessons that they taught me while completing the LL.M. program
and writing this paper. For these I will be forever grateful.
I.
See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Globalization and International
Competitiveness; Some Broad Lessons of the Past Decade, in GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
2000, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 18 (Harvard University 2000).
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positive results of globalization in recent years tend to validate this
theory.2
. The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was established
in this evolving era of global trading and developing regional trade
unions, and was ratified by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to
form the world's largest free trade market. 3 But more importantly,
NAFT A was historically significant because it provided:
1. protections to its investors,
2. extensive intellectual property provisions, and

3. a model for integrating an economically developing country Mexico - with two of the most developed economies in the world
- the United States and Canada.'
While Mexico, the United States and Canada long ago realized the
importance of developing a strong regional trade association, a review of
NAFTA since its inception has shown that this agreement has extended
beyond the boundaries of economics, and could have an increasing
influence on the lives of Mexicans, Canadians, and Americans alike,
partially due to the treaty's impact on the environment. These
environmental problems can be traced back to two parts of the NAFTA
treaty: the NAFTA Environmental Framework,s and NAFTA Chapter 11
Investment Provisions.6 In particular, the effectiveness of the NAFTA

2.
NAFfA trade has also been shown to reinforce already-existing patterns of comparative
advantage and specialization. (See Part I - Final Analytic Framework for Assessing the
Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, at 2, Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, 1999.) Interestingly enough, according to the Harvard study mentioned
in footnote I, the growth of particular national economies during the last ten years of globalization
has been variable, based on critical factors such as a country's ability to implement new
technologies. However, an analysis of how, why, and to what eJ(tent individual nations have
benefited from globalization is outside the scope of this paper.
3.
BAKER & MCKENZIE, NAFfA HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR DOING BUSINESS
UNDER.NAFfA IO (CCH Incorporated, 1994). Prior to NAFfA, the economies of the U.S.,
MeJ'ico, and Canada represented the largest integrated market in the world - approJ'imately 370
million consumers.
4. Id. at 26.
5.
The NAFfA Environmental Framework mentioned here refers to the environmental
provisions established by the NAFfA 'Environmental Side Agreement (i.e., the North American
Agreement for Environmental Cooperation or the NAAEC).
6.
At least one critic has claimed that NAFfA harmonization of standards and regulations in
areas such as endangered species, pesticides, and hazardous waste transportation has been another
source of environmental degradation caused by NAFfA. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA, and International
Harmonization - at I, http://www.citizen.org/pctradelharmonizationalertlHarmBackgrounder.htm.
However, this topic is also outside the scope of this paper.
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environmental side agreement has been questioned by many critics, 7 and
the ability of foreign corporations to use Chapter II's provisions in ways
that can restrict or even negate governments' ability to protect human
welfare and the environment has been the cause for much concern. 8
In this paper, the author will discuss some of the environmental issues
surrounding these two parts of the NAFfA machinery based on recent
developments. 9 Written in seven parts, Part II provides the NAFT A
historical background. Part III discusses the NAFf A Environmental
Framework, and Part IV discusses the NAFfA Chapter 11 Investment
Provisions.
Part V reviews the Submissions of Environmental
Enforcement Matters and provides recent academic criticisms of the
CEC Process and NAFf A Chapter 11 based on NAFf A environmental
studies. Part VI reviews critical Chapter 11 cases. Part Vll provides
critique and recommendations on how improvements might be made, and
Part VIII concludes the paper.
ll.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAFT A

Trade between Mexico and the United States has always been
substantial. In the final year prior to NAFTA, U.S. trade with Mexico
was US$81 billion, with Mexico being one of the few countries with
which the United States has enjoyed a trade surplus. 1O In fact, Mexico
ranked second as a United States trading partner in 2000, accounting for

7. Public comments solicited by the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), which is part
of the NAFfA environmental framework to be discussed later, generally referred to transparency,
timeliness, and effectiveness as the main concerns surrounding NAFfA's overall environmental
submission process.
8.
See Howard Mann, Private Rights, Public Problems, A Guide to NAFrA's Controversial
Chapter On Investor Rights, International Institute For Sustainable Development, 2001, at I. Also
according to Dr. Mann, in spite of enormous concern among many critics, NAFfA's investment
rules continue to provide the working model for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, and
for other international agreements. See Howard Mann, supra, at viii. The view by many critics is
that the use of NAFfA Chapter 11 as a model for other investment agreements is at this point
premature for reasons that are discussed later.
9.
Professor Paul KibeI suggests that prior to the current regime of North American
environmental law, the pre-1993 period was limited to national issues that were physically
transnational and did not deal with environmental and natural issues that were economically or
politically transnational, areas which are now at the center of the current trade-environment debate.
See CEC: JPAC: Comments on the JPAC Public Review of Issues Concerning the Implementation
and Further Elaboration of Articles 14 and 15; Paul Stanton KibeI, The Paper Tiger Awakens:
North American Environmental Law After The Cozumel Reef Case, March, 2000, at 7;
http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/jpac/comments/Kibel.pdf.
10. See BAKER & McKENZIE, supra note 3 at 10.
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10% of U.S. trade. 1I Furthermore, in 2000, $123.2 billion in merchandise
exports to Mexico dramatically surpassed U.S. exports to Japan, even
though the Mexican economy is just one-tenth the size of Japan's.12 That
year, the United States was Mexico's predominant trading partner,
accounting for 82% of Mexican exports and 70% of Mexican imports. 13
The idea of establishing a free trade arena was first introduced by then
Mexican President Carlos Salinas in early 1990. 14 Salinas saw NAFfA
as a way of facilitating Mexico's socioeconomic development. ls This
view was supported by the evolving investment liberalization rules that
emerged during the 1980's, which would be incorporated into NAFTAthat an investment agreement would be a positive element in attracting
foreign investors, and that investment liberalization would lead to a
higher level of economic efficiency for the host countries and businesses
alike. 16 Mexican officials also believed that Mexico's future would be
enhanced by closer cooperation and integration with its northern
neighbor. 11 Additionally Mexico wanted to guard against resurgent U.S.
protectionism by first securing market access, and then profiting from
preferential access to the U.S. market, which would likely bring greater
quality, innovation, and efficiencies that come with free market
competition. IS
United States officials recognized the economic value of the developing
Mexican market, where U.S. exports had nearly doubled during the prior
five years. 19 The U.S. also realized the need to develop regional
competitiveness in light of other regional trade agreements that were
being forged around the world. 20 Furthermore, the U.S. foresaw the value
of having a stable and increasingly prosperous democratic southern
neighbor, leading to greater political and economic stability, reduced

11. See U.S. Department Of State: Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Mfairs, Background Note:
Mexico, Profile, Apri12001, at 5, http://www.state.gov/r/palbgnJindex.cfm?docid=1838.
12. [d.
13.

[d.

14. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 9.
15. According to Dr. Mann, Mexico also embraced the goal of attracting new foreign
investment, and saw NAFfA's Chapter 11 investment provisions as a way of advertising that
Mexico was a new and safe place to do business. Five and six years later, Mexico became the most
steadfast supporter of the NAFfA investment regime, having seen an exponential increase in
investments from its NAFfA partners. See Mann, supra note 8, at 7.
16. [d. at 6.
17. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 10.
18. [d. at 11.
19. [d. at 10.
20. [d. at 11.
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friction, and fewer problems. 21 This situation was also fueled by the fact
that trading prior to NAFf A had resulted in an average 10 percent
Mexican tariff being applied to U.S. exports, while the average U.S.
tariff was only 2.07 percenU2
Summarizing the historical ties between Mexico and the U.S. that have
had so much to do with the establishment of NAFfA, U.S. relations with
Mexico are as important and complex as with any country in the world.23
U.S. relations with Mexico have a direct impact on the lives and
livelihoods of millions of Americans - whether the issue is trade and
economic reform, drug control, migration, or the promotion of
democracy.24 As recognized by many, the time was ripe to abandon the
various levels of trade protectionism that each country had previously
utilized, and NAFfA was signed, ratified, and became effective on
January 1, 1994.
Since implementation, the economic effects of NAFf A reported by both
government and outside studies have been consistent. However,
isolating these effects has been particularly difficult because of three
significant events: 1) the strong performance of the U.S. economy, 2)
Mexico's balance-of-payment crisis and recession of 1995, and 3) U.S.
implementation of most favored nation ("MFN") tariff cuts mandated by
the Uruguay Round agreements. 25 Several important economic effects of
NAFf A reported by the United States Trade Representative are
mentioned below.
- Since NAFfA's passage in 1993, American's economy has
boomed. As of this writing, we had created the longest
peacetime expansion in American history. We had reduced
unemployment from 7.4 percent to 4.3 percent - the lowest level
in twenty-eight years, with eighteen million more Americans on
the job today than at the beginning of 1993.26

21. [d.
22. According to the General Secretariat, Organization of American States. NAFfA has
reduced Mexico's average tariff to 2.9 percent (a 7.1 percent drop) and the U.S. average tariff to .65
percent (a 1.4 percent drop); see Study On The Operation and Effect Of The North American Free
Trade Agreement. General Secretariat. Organization of American States. (1996-2000) at Chapter I.
Part I. 1.
23. See U.S. Department Of State. supra note II. at 7.
24. [d.
25.
[d. at 9.
26. See USTR - "NAFfA Works For America" NAFfA 5-Year Report Card. July 1999. at 1.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

5

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 8 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 6

102

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTL & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 8:1

- During NAFfA's first five years, U.S. merchandise exports
to Mexico increased 90 percent. U.S. merchandise exports to
Canada, our largest trading partner, increased 55 percent.
Together, this meant $93 billion in export growth from 1993 to
1998 - two fifths of the growth in U.S. exports to the world. 27
- Jobs supported by U.S. goods exports to our NAFfA partners
were estimated to total 2.6 million in 1998, an increase of 31
percent (over 600,000 new jobs) from 1993, prior to NAFfA.28
Goods export-related jobs pay an average of 16% more than nonexport relatedjobs. 29
- The vast bulk - over 85 percent - of our NAFfA trade is in
manufactured goods. Trade in this sector grew by over 66
percent between 1993 and 1998.30
- U.S. agricultural exports to NAFfA partners totaled $13.2
billion in 1998, or a fourth of all U.S. agricultural exports to the
world. 3l
- U.S. merchandise exports to Canada climbed nearly 66
percent since NAFfA entered into force.32
- U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico have more than doubled
from pre-NAFfA levels (growing from $41.6 billion in 1993 to
$87 billion in 1999. 33
In contrast, in its own study, Public Citizen reported substantially
different results at the NAFfA five-year mark. For example, the group
claimed the loss of higher paying U.S. manufacturing jobs replaced by
lower wage service jobs.34 Public Citizen also reported a widespread job
loss of over 200,000 U.S. workers certified as NAFTA casualties under
just one narrow government program. 35 Other Public Citizen findings
include:

27. [d.
28.
/d.
29. See USTR - World Regions - Western Hemisphere, NAFTA Ove11liew, June 2001, at I,
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/overview.shtml.
30. See USTR, supra note 26, at 1.
31. /d.
32. See The President's 1999 Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program and 2000
Trade Policy Agenda, at 173.
33. [d.,
34. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - School of Real-Life Results - Report Card NAFTA January 1, 1994 to January 1, 1999 (December 1998), at 4.
35. [d. at 3.
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- The replacement of high-paying manufacturing jobs with
lower paying employment such as cashiers, waitresses, janitors
and retail clerks,36
- The development of "negative bargaining power" for many
American workers whose jobs have not been relocated by
putting them in direct competition with skilled, educated
Mexican workers who work for a dollar or two an hour - or
less,37
- NAFfA's failure to reverse the trend of so-called U.S.
"exports," where U.S. goods are shipped to Mexican
maquiladora plants, and then re-imported back to the U.S. as
finished products,38
- The development of a $8.9 billion manufacturing sector trade
deficit with Mexico, from a pre-NAFfA $4.6 billion trade
surplus,39 and
- The failure of 60 of 67 companies to fulfill their promise to
create new jobs after NAFfA, when they had made that promise
during a February 1997 Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch
investigation.40
In the author's view, reconciling these two contradictory posltlOns
requires the consideration of the one overriding and generally accepted
economic phenomenon already mentioned - that since NAFfA's
passage, America has experienced the longest peacetime expansion in
American history.41 It is clear that NAFfA has at least not derailed this
economic expansion.

III.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK OF NAFfA

Much of the opposition to NAFfA was based on fear that environmental
standards would become so relaxed that companies would elect to

36.
[d. at4.
37.
[d.
38.
[d. According to the Public Citizen report, in 1990,34.7 % of U.S. exports to Mexico were
re-shipped to the U.S. as finished goods.
39.
[d.
40. [d.
41. See US1R, supra note 26, at 1.
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relocate to Mexico. 42 Concerns were also raised that additional industrial
activity generated by NAFf A would exacerbate pre-existing
environmental and public health problems caused by a high
concentration of export manufacturing plants in the free trade zone along
the U.S.-Mexico border.43 Environmental groups were split over
NAFTA, with the Audubon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund,
the World Wildlife Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council
supporting the agreement, and Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, and the
Sierra Club opposing it. 44
The United States sought strong provisions and enforcement structures to
protect the environment/5 so a "parallel track" environmental agenda was
initiated independent of the NAFTA negotiations, and on August 12,
1993, Canada, the U.S., and Mexico signed the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC").46
However, within NAFTA itself, Article 104: Relation to Environmental
and Conservation Agreements sets out to reiterate the prevailing
obligations of three prior treaties: the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (done on March 3,
1973), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Ozone Layer (done on September 16, 1987), and the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal (done on March 22, 1989). Furthermore, Annex 104.1;
Bilateral and Other Environmental and Conservation Agreements also
bound the parties to two other conservation agreements: The Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste
(1986), and the Agreement Between the U.S. and Mexico on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Border Area (1983).

42. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 245. Furthennore, NAFfA Chapter II Article
1114 was included in NAFfA to minimize the relaxation of environmental standards for the purpose
of attracting foreign investment. See discussion in Part ill, infra.
43. See Public Citizen, supra note 34, at 6.
44. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 245.
45. Professor Paul KibeI suggests that the mere initiation of environmental negotiations at this
time indicates that between 1990 and 1992, the public increasingly came to view trade integration
and environmental protection as interrelated, rather than as independent policy issues. (See KibeI,
supra note 9, at 9.)
46. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 245.
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The NAAEC establishes the Commission for Environmental Cooperation
("CEC") to address regional environmental concerns, help prevent
potential trade and environmental conflicts, and promote the enforcement
of environmental law.47 The Council is also responsible for further
consultation and cooperation among the parties to avoid environmentrelated trade disputes. 48 The NAAEC also provides that any nongovernmental organization, and any person, may make submissions to
the CEC Secretariat asserting that one of the parties is failing to
effectively enforce its environmentallaws. 49
Upon submission of an Article 14 petition, the Secretariat must then
determine whether the submission merits a response from the alleged
violating party under Article 14(2).50 The Secretariat must consider
whether (a) the submission alleges harm to the submitter, (b) the
submission would advance the goals of the NAAEC, (c) private remedies
have been pursued, and (d) the submission is drawn exclusively from
mass media reports. 51 There is no time limit for the Secretariat to make
this determination. 52
If the Secretariat determines that no response is necessary and that the
submission need not be considered, it must set forth its position in a
"determination."53 If the Secretariat determines that a response is
merited, the alleged violating party has 60 days to prepare a response as
to whether judicial proceedings are pending, and whether private
remedies are available. If the Secretariat, after review of the response,
determines that additional investigation is warranted, Article 15 provides
that the Secretariat can request that the Council approve, by a two-thirds
vote, the preparation of a "factual record" of the dispute. 54 Again, there is

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 251.
Id.
Id. at 252. However, under Article 14(1), the submitter must be a person or organization
residing in or established in the territory of a party; and under Article 14(2), the Secretariat must
consider whether the submission alleges harm to the submitter prior to determining whether a
response is warranted. So given the effect of Article 14(1) and 14(2), the idea that any person or
non-governmental organization can make a submission is somewhat misleading, since these
"standing" requirements can render the submission invalid.
50. See KibeI, supra note 9, at 17. Prior to determining whether a response is merited, the
submission must meet other formal standards set forth in Article 14(1) such as clear identification of
the submitting party, and the provision of enough information to determine whether a response is
warranted. (See CEC - Lessons Learned - Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC, Submitted by the JPAC, April 2001, at 3.)
51. See CEC, supra note 50, at 4.
52. Id.
53. See KibeI, supra note 9, at 17.
54. Id. Critics have also commented that there are no established standards for determining
whether an investigation is warranted.
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no deadline for this decision. 55 This request to the Council is set forth in
a "deterrnination."56 If authorized by the Council, this factual record will
evaluate the factual and legal basis for the Article 14 petition.57 The final
version of the Secretariat's factual record m.ust be approved by a twothirds vote of the CEC's Council. 58
Beyond publication of the factual record by the CEC, there are no other
penalties or sanctions available to private parties for enforcing the
NAAEC's provision, nor are there procedures to ensure actual
implementation of any recommendations that may be set forth in the
factual record. 59 Some criticism of NAFT A has been based on this
apparent lack of CEC enforcement power.60 However, supporters
emphasize that as sovereign nations, each NAFTA party has a sovereign
right to control the activities within its own borders, and that this right
must act as a limitation to the treaty's grant of environmental oversight
authority.61 Officials from the CEC have also pointed out that the CEC is
not an enforcement agency, and that in fact, no international
environmental organization has enforcement power.62

55.
56.
57.

See CEC, supra note 50, at 4.
See Kibei, supra note 9, at 17.
Id. at 18.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60. See Public Citizen, supra note 34, at 18.
61. The principle of national sovereignty is emphasized many times in the. NAFfA
instrumentation. To illustrate three examples, the NAFT A Preamble itself states that the NAFfA
parties are "RESOLVED TO . .. PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare .... "
Furthermore, the NAAEC Preamble states that the NAFTA parties have agreed to the NAAEC,
while "REAFFIRMING the SOVEREIGN RIGHT of States to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental and development policies and their responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction .... " Finally, in Council Resolution 00-09 which is
discussed later, the CEC states that it 'FURTHER [Recognizes] that countries that are parties to
international agreements are SOLELY COMPETENT to interpret such instruments ... .' However,
the principle of national sovereignty has become a double-edged sword that is also at the center of
this debate. For example, the right of a sovereign nation to govern over its own land and protect its
own people also extends to abusing its own citizens and destroying its own environment. AIl three
NAFfA parties have expressed concern over this national sovereignty-environmental protection
balancing problem, particularly as it relates to "the other" NAFfA parties. [emphasis added]
62. Scott Vaughan, the Head of the Environment, Economy and Trade Program for the CEC,
responded with this footnoted answer to the request to please comment on the enforcement power of
the CEC on June 12, 2001, in a questionnaire sent to him specifically for this paper. Other
commentators have also responded along similar lines. For example, see CEC: JPAC, Public
Consultation on the Draft JPAC Public Review of Issues Concerning the Implementation and
Further Elaboration of Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC, Executive Summary of Public Comments
Received, October 2000, at 15, where the Canadian Council for International Business (CCrn) stated
that 'The function of the [CEq is to promote the effective enforcement of environmentallaw ... it is
not the CEC's role to set policies or mandate environmental practices - this is the proper domain of
the NAFfA governments.'
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Because individual parties have raised other issues about the
interpretation and application of Articles 14 and 15 under the NAAEC/3
on June 12,2000, the CEC established a public review process for issues
concerning the "implement{ltion and further elaboration" of those articles
under Council Resolution 00-09. 64 This resolution also established the
Joint Public Advisory Committee ("JPAC") to conduct the public review
process, and to advise the Council on how these issues might be
resolved. 6s However, the Council stated that the premier purpose of
Council Resolution 00-09 was to ensure that any discussions concerning
the implementation of Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC included a
process for public involvement~66 The Council further reiterated that this
review process " ... does not mean amendment of the NAAEC."67
In essence, the review process dictates that it is. the responsibility of the
JPAC to receive issues from the public,68 transmit them to the Council,
and provide advice to the Council on all issues referred to it by the
Council no matter what the source (party, Secretariat, public or JPAC
itself).69 Any member of the public wishing to raise an issue may provide
a written statement to the JPAC, but the statement may not exceed three
pages. 70 If the JPAC determines that the written statement does not raise
a relevant issue, the JPAC will forward the statement to the Council
accompanied by a written explanation of why it considers that the issue

63. See CEC: JPAC - Who We Are - Council - COUNCIL RESOLUTION 00·09, June 13,
2000, at I, http://www.cec.orglwho_we_arelcouncillresolution.
64. "Implementation and further elaboration" according to the Council means "carry into
effect, as determined through a review of the policies and practices of the Council, Secretariat, and
JPAC." (See CEC supra note 9, at 1.)
65. Id.
66. Id. In the Resolution's Preamble, the CEC further recognized "the need for transparency
and public participation before decisions are made concerning implementation of the public
submission process under Articles [14 and 15]." The JPAC released calls for comments on this
review process on July 31, 2000, to 5,800 persons from various sectors including NGO's,
government bodies, acadernic institutions, etc., and the general comments received stated that this
new review process has "the potential to bring much needed transparency." Other notable
comments received from the public overwhelmingly relate to the timeliness and effectiveness of the
Article 14 and 15 submission process. The other purpose of the JPAC stated in this document is to
"[review] the public history of submissions made under Articles 14 and 15, including all actions
taken to implement those articles, and [to compile] a report identifying lessons learned." (See CEC,
supra note 63, at 1.)
67. Id.
68. According to the JPAC Public Consultation Guidelines, the purpose of a public issue may
be to "Establish a policy or directive; assist in the preparation of the program of the CEC; obtain
views in the context of a specific project; and address a specific issue or set of issues." (See CEC
supra note 63, at 1.)
69. See CEC: JPAC, supra note 62, at 8.
70.
[d.
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is not within the scope of Resolution 00-09.71 The written explanation
will also be sent to the person (or organization) who raised the issue, and
the explanation will be posted on the CEC website within seven working
days.72
When the JPAC determines that the issue raised by the public is relevant,
it will transmit the issue - in writing - to the Council, and this
determination will also be sent to the person who raised the issue.?3 The
issue will also be posted on the CEC website within seven working
days.?4 When the JPAC receives the Council's decision to address or not
• to the person who raised the
address the issue, this decision will be sent
issue, and the decision will be posted on the CEC website within seven
working days.?5
Upon receipt of an issue from the Council, the JPAC will hold a public
review process in the format that it determines is necessary to provide
advice to the CounciU6 This format will be posted on the CEC website. 77
Following its review, the JPAC will provide written advice, including
reasoned argumentation to the Council.78 The written advice will also be
sent to the person who raised the issue, and the advice will be posted on
the CEC website within seven working days.?9
IV.

NAFfA INVESTMENT PROVISIONS

NAFfA's investment provisions are covered in Chapter 11, and apply to
investments by an investor of one party in the territory of another party
and with the resolution of a dispute between a party and an investor of

71. [d. The author believes that there also need to be published standards for the JPAC's
determination of a "relevant issue" in this context.
72. [d.
73.
[d.
74.
75.

[d.
[d. As with the JPAC determination of "relevant issue," the author believes the factors
considered, and the process followed by the CEC to make a decision on whether to address or not

address an issue, need to be defined and made public.
76.
[d. at 9. It seems reasonable to assume that the public review format selected by the JPAC
would also be "transparent." However, no documentation has been found to suggest that
transparency will be a requirement of the public review format selected by the JPAC. Standards in
this area would also be helpful, specifying the process the JPAC will follow in determining the
review format, and the factors it will consider in making that determination.
77.
[d.
78.
[d.
79.

[d.
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another party.so Under these provisions, investments and investors are
protected from certain types of "measures" taken by governments. 81 The
definition of "measures" is broad - it includes all laws adopted by
national, state or provincial legislatures; regulations that implement these
laws; local or municipal laws and bylaws; and policies that affect
government interaction with businesses82 - which means that investors
are protected from nearly all forms of government action. 83 Chapter 11
also applies to all "measures," including those that were adopted prior to
NAFfA unless they were specifically excluded by being listed in an
Annex to NAFfA. 84 However, this retroactivity does not apply to local,
state, and provincial measures adopted before January 1, 1994.85
The foundation of NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Provisions lies in
five binding principles, which have been the subject of considerable
dispute since NAFTA's inception. These binding principles include: 1I6
- National treatment (Article 1102);
- Most-favoured nation treatment (Article 1103);
- Minimum international standard of treatment (Article 1104);
- Prohibitions against certain performance requirements on
investors (Article 1106); and
- Provisions governing expropriation (Article 1110).
The NAFf A parties are susceptible to attack for violation of any of these
principles under the authority vested in Chapter 11, Section B of the
NAFfA Agreement. Unprecedented in international law, Section B
outlines provisions governing the "Settlement of Disputes between a
Party and an Investor of Another Party." These provisions establish the

80. See BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 123. Also see Chapter II Article 1101: Scope
and Coverage.
8!. See Mann, supra note 8, at 9.
82. Id.
83. The term "measures" is not the only word that has been interpreted broadly within the
Chapter II context. For example in the S.D. Meyers v. Canada case (Notice of Arbitration: July 22,
1998), "investment" was interpreted to mean assets such as market share in a sector, and access to
markets in the host state, whether or not the investor even owns a physical plant or retail store in that
country. That is, almost any kind of business activity can constitute an "investment" that is subject
to protection. (See Mann, supra note 8, at 23.)
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id.
86. See NAFTA 's Chapter II And The Environment: Addressing The Impacts Of The InvestorState Process On The Environment; International Institute For Sustainable Development (IISD), at 3,
httpllwww.iisd.ca.
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most extensive set of rights and remedies ever provided to foreign
investors in an international agreement. 8?
Originally included in NAFTA to protect U.S. and Canadian investors in
what was considered a suspect Mexican system, the dispute settlement
mechanism (via Article 1116) gives an individual investor the right to
challenge host governments on their compliance with the agreement. 88
This right, in turn, has brought two central issues to the forefront. First,
the process allows foreign investors· to sidestep procedural or public
interest safeguards in favor of a non-transparent, secretive system of
arbitration with no right to appea1. 89 Secondly, given the ease of
initiating these disputes (i.e., costs and preparation are minimal, and
party consent is not required), the use of traditional defensive investor
provisions has shifted to an offensive strategic tool.90 (See Ethyl Corp.
case discussed in Part VI, infra.)
Articles 1102 and 1103 provide for national treatment and most-favorednation treatment of NAFT A investors. Both of these articles require that
"Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances ... " "to its own
investors" (Article 1102) and "to investors of any other Party ... " (Article
1103). The conflict in these particular provisions has arisen from the
expansive interpretation of "no less favorable" and "in like
circumstances" in the cases already on record. 91 (See Ethyl Corp. case
discussed in Part VI, infra.)
Article 1105 sets a minimum standard of treatment of investors "in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security." The cases on record attacking the
parties for violation of this Article revolve around due process violations
and the denial of justice.92 (See the Loewen case discussed in Part VI,
infra.)
Article 1106 establishes performance requirements for the NAFTA
parties, and states that "No Party may impose or enforce any of the

87.
[d. Also of interest is that NAFfA investors may choose either the NAFfA or WTO
dispute settlement procedures to resolve an issue.
88. [d. This mechanism has been referred to as the investor-state dispute settlement process.
89. [d. The dispute settlement process also gives rise to several potential constitutional
problems that are discussed later in this paper.
90. [d.
91. [d. at 4.
92. ld.
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following requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in
connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a
non-Party in its territory; [to export a given level. .. of goods, to achieve
given level ... of domestic content] ... etc."
Subsection 6 of Article 1106 outlines exceptions "necessary to protect
human, animal, and plant life," and "the conservation of living and
exhaustible natural resources." Conflicts have arisen when the NAFf A
parties have attempted to utilize Article 1106 (6) exceptions given the
narrowly interpreted meaning of "necessary" in the environmental and
international law sense. 93 Investors have also used Article 1106 to
challenge bans on toxic substances, claiming that such bans essentially
act as performance requirements by establishing domestic content
requirements. 94 (See the Ethyl Corp. case discussed in Part VI, infra.)
Article 1106 is supplemented by the environmental language in Article
1114, which contains an unprecedented international commitment to
avoid relaxing environmental laws as a means of competing for foreign
investmenU5 While the language of the core commitment in this article
contains the term "should" instead of "shall," any party who believes that
the spirit of the commitment is being violated can require other parties to
enter into consultations.% But perhaps the most puzzling issue
surrounding the environmental language in Articles 1106 and 1114 is
that the relationship between a party's right under Article 1114 to
challenge another party's alleged relaxation of environmental laws and
the submission process for "environmental enforcement" matters under
the NAAEC has never been established.91 Furthermore, the NAFrA
governments have thus far been reluctant to allow the CEC to even
explore this potential connection.98
Article 1110 of the NAFfA Chapter 11 investment provisions outlines
expropriation and compensation protections, and has probably attracted
the most public attention because of the provision's impact on
environmental regulations. 99 Article 1110 states that "No Party may
directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an

93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.

99.

Id.
Id.
Mann, supra note 8, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment except: [(a) for a
public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) on payment of
compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 6]."
The major issues that have arisen under Article 1110 involve indirect
nationalization, which has been argued in some cases to be tantamount to
expropriation. 1oo Under the evolving "case law," a new legal-political
concept of regulatory expropriation appears to be emerging. That is:
Any national or sub-national government regulations (laws,
treaties, administrative measures, policies), which reduce or limit
the value of the private commercial property can be considered a
form of regulatory expropriation. 101
In light of these cases, the fear is that environmental and safety laws
arising out of a NAFTA party's "police powers" will now be attacked as
expropriation, which have typically not been appropriate substantive
grounds under traditional international law.102 And given the expansive
definition of the .term "measures" so far interpreted under these
provisions, there is a real legal question as to whether these new investor
rights conflict with U.S. constitutional rights granted to the U.S.
government, which seems to allow for land regulation by state and local
government under a less restrictive interpretation of "regulatory
takings. "103

As discussed in the Chapter 11 cases in Part VI, the full impact of the
new investor rights granted under NAFT A Chapter 11 has yet to be
determined, as seen by the lack of finality of many of the current
disputes. However, the investor's strategic use of these provisions to
claim expropriation because of health and environmental measures
instituted by host governments could unfairly shift the cost of protecting
health, safety, and the environment onto the shoulders of the taxpayer.
As with the evaluation of any other investment, these costs should clearly
be included in an investor's own risk assessment, and the responsibility
for cleaning up any environmental damage should lie squarely with the
polluter and not the public. Unfortunately, what has occurred so far as a

100. [d. at 5.
101. See WTO - The NAFTA Ruling On MetalClad I'S. Mexico, September 2000, at 4;
http://www.wtoaction.org.
102. [d.
103. [d. Article 1110 now gives investors three ways to attack Party Article 1110 violations via
expropriation, indirect expropriation, and measures tantamount to expropriation.
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result of the NAFfA Chapter 11 investment provisions is the granting of
special international law-based rights to foreign investors - and the
means to enforce them - without the commensurate, counterbalancing
obligations and responsibilities. l
()4

V.
A REVIEW OF SUBMISSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT MATIERS AND RECENT ACADEMIC
CRITICISM OF THE CEC SUBMISSION PROCESS BASED ON
NAFfA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
Part of the purpose of the NAAEC is stated in the following quotation
from Article 1 of the Agreement:
Article 1: Objectives:
The objectives of this Agreement are to: (a) foster the
protection and improvement of the environment in the
territories of the Parties for the well being of present
and future generations ....
Based on Article 1, objective (a), some obvious questions arise from the
inclusion of a submission process designed to promote environmental
enforcement. Primarily, how can challenging the lack of enforcement be
a significant and effective way to protect and improve the environment
for "present and future generations?"I05 If domestic environmental laws
themselves are inadequate, how can environmental enforcement be
challenged when there is no environmental law to enforce?l06 Or if the

104. Mann, supra note 8, at 19.
105. Professor Kibei suggests that environmental law under what he refers to as the 1993 North
American Regime - which among other things includes the NAAEC, the CEC, and the JPAC, are not
legal provisions or institutions, in that they do not set forth new, binding environmental standards for
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 14. He also brings up the
question of whether the NAAEC framework is flexible enough to evolve politically, and whether
environmentalists should try to limit the 1993 Regime as a model for international negotiations with
other Central and South American nations. [d. at 47.
106. To further illustrate this point, the JPAC has stated that "NGO's from the NAAEC
countries have repeatedly turned to the Article 14 and 15 process when they believed that domestic
environmental remedies were not adequate to address their complaint," and that the process of
developing a factual record itself provides for opportunities and areas of compromise and settlement
of environmental disputes [in the case of these potentially inadequate domestic environmental
remedies]. See CEC, supra note 50, at 12. However in the author's opinion this analysis is
incomplete. For example, if a domestic environmental law does not exist, or if a remedy is
inadequate, domestic enforcement is not a problem. In this case, the CEC would not have
jurisdiction over the environmental matter, no factual record would ever be created, and there would
be no opportunity as described by the JPAC to address the inadequacies of the domestic
environmental law - or its remedies.
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judicial process itself is suspect, under what authority can unjust
domestic judicial proceedings be challenged to enable the protection and
improvement of the environment?107 And even more importantly, given
that the NAAEC submission process does uncover a clear lack of
environmental enforcement as it is designed to do, what guarantees are
there that the abuse will be corrected, or that the process will produce
Instead, why couldn't strong
any positive results whatsoever?108
remedies,l09 provisions, or environmental standards llo agreed upon by the
NAFfA parties be used to hold NAFfA polluters accountable, since
these polluters would have already voluntarily availed themselves of the
benefits of NAFf A ?III And couldn't these violators themselves be
subjected to NAFfA remedies without compromising a NAFfA party's
sovereign right to self-govem?112
These issues highlight some of the very problems inherent in trying to
measure the effectiveness of the NAFf A environmental policy, since the
NAAEC speaks of environmental protection but only provides for
"foster[ing]" environmental enforcement. Stuck between the lines of this
fuzzy NAFfA language,1\3 both the environmental submissions, and the
reported environmental effects caused by NAFfA are discussed below.
First, a short summary of all the submissions since 1995 is provided,

107. It seems that this situation could still occur, notwithstanding the procedural guarantees
enumerated in Article 7 of the NAAEC, which calls for "fair, open, and equitable ... [judicial
proceedings] ... that comply with due process of law .... "
108. See CEC, supra note 50, at 12.
109. With regard to the inclusion of stronger remedies, some commentators have suggested that
a more adequate remedy plan, including preventive and corrective programs, could be linked to the
factual record via Article 13 (i.e., include these remedies in the factual report) without amending the
NAAEC. See CEC, supra note 50, at 12. However, even if remedies were included in the factual
record, in this case, the question would still remain as to how these recommended remedies would be
enforced.
110. On the issue of standards, the author is not professing that a complete set of environmental
policies should have been included in NAFrA. The point is that perhaps some level of
environmental regulation could have been agreed upon to help directly address environmental
violations.
111. Professor Kibei suggests that regardless of the apparent lack of enforceability, the
components discussed here as the "NAFrA Environmental Provisions" are still useful in
establishing soft norms and general principles that may help shape how Canada, Mexico, and the
U.S. approach and resolve environmental issues within the context of the 1993 North American
Regime. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 15.
112. The author is re-emphasizing the point that NAFrA (via the NAAEC) should have been
structured to minimize environmental harm rather than to maximize environmental enforcement, and
that this could have been accomplished without jeopardizing a NAFrA party's national sovereignty.
In fact, it has been reported that President Clinton himself announced in October 4, 1992 speech at
North Carolina State University that the CEC "should have the power to provide remedies, including
the power to impose penalties and assess monetary damages." See Kibei, supra note 9, at 9.
113. In the author's view, the NAAEC Article I objective (a) amounts to little more than excess
verbiage because even in the best light, the instrument does not provide adequate tools for
accomplishing this goal.
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followed by a more detailed discussion of the two submissions that
resulted in the development of a factual record - Cozumel (submission
ID SEM-96-001), and BC Hydro (submission ID SEM-97-001).
Criticism of the CEC submission process based on a review of NAFf A
environmental studies completes this section.
According to the CEC Secretariat, as of this writing, thirty-one
submissions have been received since 1995, of which ten involve
Canada, thirteen Mexico, and eight the United States. 114 Nineteen files
have been closed, and twelve submissions are under review. Of the
closed files, seven have been dismissed under Article 14(1), three have
been dismissed under Article 14(2), two submissions have been
terminated under Article 14(3), three submissions have been terminated
under Article 15(1), one submission has been terminated under Article
15(2), one submission has been withdrawn, and two factual records have
been prepared and made public.
Of the twelve submissions currently under review, eight involve Mexico
(SEM-00-OO6, SEM-OI-003, SEM-97-002, SEM-00-OO5, SEM-OI-OOl,
SEM-00-005, SEM-OI-003, SEM-OI-00l), one involves the United
States (SEM-98-003), and three involve Canada (SEM-97-006, SEM-98004, SEM-00-04). On May 16, 2000, the Council unanimously decided
to instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record with respect to
SEM-98-007, and the Secretariat informed the Council that the
Secretariat considers that SEM-98-006 warrants developing a factual
record, both of which involve Mexico. lls And on December 15,2000, the
Secretariat informed the Council that the Secretariat considers that SEM00-002 warrants developing a factual record, which involves the U.S.116
In trying to assess the significance of all these submissions in light of

these impressive numbers,117 the author will reiterate some points that
have already been discussed to some extent at the beginning of this
section:
How do we know that all environmental enforcement abuses have been
reported?
And what can be done to optimize the reporting of

114. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters; Status, at I, httpllwww.cec.orglcitizenlstatus/index.
liS. Id.
116. Id.
117. The author suggests that at first glance, the number of submissions received since 1995
(thirty-one), and the percentage of closed files (about 61 %) both could be viewed as respectable
statistics given the length of time that NAFf A has been in force.
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enforcement abuses through NAAEC submissions? (See the summary of
the Relocation of the Stonewashing Industry study in Part V where
environmental abuses have not been reported.)
How can we assess and reconcile the possibility that a NAFT A party's
environmental laws are inadequate or even approach a minimum level of
protection? And how can we strive to correct these judicial inadequacies
without violating the sovereign rights of each NAFT A party?
How can we encourage the NAFTA parties to take the necessary steps to
remedy the environmental harm caused by NAFTA?"8
A.

THE CRUISE SHIP PIER PROJECT IN COZUMEL AND BC HYDRO

The two current factual records may shed light on the existing process.
The Cazumel case was the fIrst submission that resulted in the
development of a factual record under the NAAEC guidelines. In
Cazumel, the submitters, consisting of the Committee For The Protection
Of Natural Resources A.C., the International Group Of One Hundred,
A.c., an~ the Mexican Center for Environmental Law, A.c., alleged that
the appropriate authorities failed to effectively enforce environmental
laws which in their view called for the development of a comprehensive
Environmental Impact Assessment ("BIA") for the entire project, rather
than simply for a single new pier - prior to initiating the project
"Construction and Operation of a Public Harbor Terminal for Tourist
Cruises on the Island of Cozumel, State of Quitana Roo."119
Cozumel is an island located in the Yucatan Peninsula about 40 miles
south of CancunYo The waters off the island's southwest coast contain a
large coral reef zone, the reefs of which are considered among the most

118. This question will be difficult to address because aside from the many problems discussed
in this paper, all the effects of NAFTA are simply not known. According to Scott Vaughan, the head
of the Environment, Economy and Trade Program at the CEC, "it is highly unlikely that any method
or approach can capture all environmental effects [caused by NAFrA], mainly because of the
absence of aggregated indicators." (See Scott Vaughan, supra note 62) In the CEC study entitled
Assessing Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement - An Analytical
Framework (Phase II) and Issues Studies published by the CEC Secretariat in 1999, at 37, the
Secretariat reiterates the view that the "cumulative [environmental] impact. .. on the air, water, land
and living things ... and the overall state of the entire ecosystem is of essential concern." The report
further goes on to state that "however, at present, it is appropriate to focus individually on the major
aspects of each separate component of the ambient environment .... [And] these selected indicators
should cover both standard scientific measures and items of particular importance in patterns of
North American environmental change."
119. See CEC, supra note 50 at 8.
120. See KibeI, supra note 9, at 47.
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spectacular and biologically diverse in the world. 12I The goal of the
project was to build a new cruise ship pier on Cozumel in order to
increase tourism on the island. 122 However, environmentalists believed
that the construction and operation of the cruise ship pier would cause
serious damage to many of the reefs, including those located in the
Cozumel Marine Refuge. 123
The submitters (petitioners) asserted that allowing the presentation of a
"partial" environmental impact report with respect only to the new pier
would undercut the purpose of the environmental impact evaluation by
creating uncertainty with respect to the subject matter of the evaluation. l24
The submitters also claimed that the environmental impact statement
submitted by the developer was incomplete, and should have taken
account of the projects directly related to the work or proposed activity,
in order to evaluate the cumulative environmental impact these projects
would have. 125
The government of Mexico contended that the submission was improper
because it challenged actions that took place before the NAAEC was in
force, and that the NAAEC cannot be retroactive. 126 Therefore, Mexico
asserted, the submission was outside the jurisdiction of the CEC.127
Mexico also claimed that the submission was inadmissible under Article
14 because the submitters did not certify their legal capacity, did not
specify the damages they suffered, and did not exhaust all remedies
available to them under Mexican law.128 And finally, Mexico disputed
many of the factual assertions in the submission, claiming that the
submitters failed to "establish a necessary relation between the alleged
environmental damage to the flora and fauna ... and the alleged violation
of environmentallaw."129
The government of Mexico argued that the submitters failed to provide
reliable evidence demonstrating the character of the organizations they

12\. {d.
122. {d.
123. {d.
124. See Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel. Quintana Roo,

Secretariat of the CEC. 1997. at 4. httpllwww.cec.org.
125. ld.atS.
126. See CEC, supra note SO. at 8.
127. [d.
128. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Citizen Submissions on

Enforcement Matters; Registry and
httpllww.cec.orglcitizenlguides_registry.

Public

Files

of

Submissions.

Cozumel,

at

2.

129. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

21

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 8 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 6

118

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTL & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 8:1

represented, and that they failed to demonstrate that the facts alleged
constituted a direct transgression of the rights of the civil associations
they purported to represent. 130 Mexico also argued that only one of the
submitters (i.e., the Committee For the Protection Of Natural Resources,
A.c.) availed itself of the popular complaint recourse, which itself is not
an administrative recourse. In Mexico's view, this established that the
submitters did not exhaust available remedies under the Mexican
legislation. 131 With regard to the EIA, Mexico claimed that:
- The authority in charge of evaluating the effects of the work
for strictly environmental purposes did not regard the concession
to build a new cruise ship pier on Cozumel as contemplating a
comprehensive or global project,132 and that
- The applicable Mexican law did not require an EIA in this
situation. 133
The Secretariat recommended the preparation of a factual record, and by
unanimous vote (Resolution 96-08), the Council asked the Secretariat to
prepare one. 134 With regard to the consideration of facts prior to the
enactment of the NAAEC, the Council directed that "in considering such
an alleged failure to enforce effectively, relevant facts prior to January 1,
1994 may be included in the Factual Record."135 The record included a
clear summary of the contentions of the parties, which provided a record
of Mexico's EIA statute. 136 However, no determination was ever made
that Mexico was, in fact, in compliance with the applicable
environmental laws. 137
In this regard, some commentators have suggested that conclusions

should be drawn from the factual records as to a party's effective
enforcement of its environmental law.138 As one commentator has

130. See Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel, Quintana Roo,
supra note 124, at 7.
131. Id.
132. [d. at 8.
133. [d. at 9. According to the Government of Mexico, Article 28 states that "when an
evaluation of the environmental impact of works or activities that are designed to develop natural
resources is involved, the Ministry shall request the interested parties to include in the corresponding
environmental impact report a description of possible consequences of these works or activities on
the relevant ecosystem ... " and that this project was not "designed to develop natural resources."
134. See CEC, supra note 50, at 8.
135. [d.
136. [d.
137. [d. at 9.
138. Idat 13.
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argued, "[Aside from] collect[ing] and summariz[ing] the arguments
presented by the different parties, the CEC Secretariat [has] made its own
independent assessment of these procedural arguments, and has made
[recommendations] on whether a Factual Record should be prepared.
There is every reason to presume that the CEC Secretariat would
demonstrate similar sound judgment and impartiality when providing an
independent assessment of substantive allegations and responses."1J9 One
factor to consider in accepting this determination would be the political
repercussions and the public's view of a multinational trade council
passing what might appear to be final judgment on a NAFTA party's
domestic enforcement, and whether such political and public reactions
would support or undermine the main purpose of the factual record to
improve the enforcement of environmental legislation.
In

Be Hydro, the Sierra Legal Defence Fund (of Canada) and the (U.S.)

Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now Earthjustice) filed a submission on
behalf of B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, British Columbia
Wildlife Federation, Trail Wildlife Associations, Steelhead Society,
Trout Unlimited, Sierra Club, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's
Association, and the Institute for Fisheries Resources with the CEC
Secretariat alleging that Canada had failed to enforce Section 35( 1) of its
Fisheries Act and utilize its powers under Section 119.06 of the National
Energy Board Act to ensure the protection of fish and fish habitat in
British Columbia's rivers from ongoing and repeated environmental
damage caused by hydro-electric dams. l40 However, the Secretariat
indicated to the Council that the factual record was appropriate only in
respect to the alleged failure to effectively enforce Section 35 of the
Fisheries Act. 141
Section 35 of the Fisheries Act provides that "No person shall carry on
any work or undertaking that results in the harmful alteration, disruption
The submitters claimed that
or destruction of fish habitat."142
notwithstanding this provision, BC Hydro, which is a Crown corporation
wholly owned by the government of the Province of British Columbia,

139. See CEC - Comments on Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and IS
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Draft Report to the CEC
Council), Paul Kibel- RE: Comments On Draft of JPAC's Lessons Learned Report On Effectiveness
of
NAAEC's
Citizen
Submission
Process,
May
10,
2001,
at
7,
http://www.cec.orglwho_we_are/jpac/comments/lessons.
140. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters; Registry and Public Files of Submissions, Be Hydro, at 1.
httpllww.cec.orglcitizenlguidesJegistry.
141. Id. at 10.
142. See CEC, supra note 50, at 5.
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had only "laid two charges" against BC Hydro since 1990, even though
there was clear and well-documented evidence that BC's operations had
damaged fish habitat on numerous occasions. 143 Furthermore, the
submitters asserted that BC Hydro had consistently and routinely
violated Section 35( I), and that the regular operation of its dams caused
consistent and substantial damage to fish and fish habitat. 144
The submitters claimed that the damage caused by Be Hydro's operation
of the dam included contributing to the extinction of many fish stocks,
the decline of an even greater number of stocks that are at risk of
extinction, and harming human populations that depend on the fisheries
for their livelihoods and cultural identities. 145 This damage, according to
the submitters, was done in at least seven ways, including reduced flows,
rapid flow fluctuation, inadequate flushing flows, altered water quality,
entrainment,'46 flow diversion, and reservoir draw down. '47
In its response, Canada claimed that it was effectively enforcing its
environmental laws, and that the submitters' definition of "effective
enforcement" was much too limited in that it "[equated] enforcement
directly with legal and judicial sanctions."'48 Canada claimed that under
Article 5 of the NAAEC, "enforcement encompasses actions broader
than just prosecution and provides a non-exhaustive list of appropriate
enforcement actions,"'49 and that it had "determined that compliance
activities ranging from voluntary compliance and compliance agreements
to legal and judicial sanctions were the most productive in terms of

143. See Factual Record For Submission SEM·97-OOJ, Secretariat of the CEC, May 30, 2000,
at 7, http/www.cec.org.
144. /d. at II.
145. /d.
146. Entrainment is one of the three distinct processes involved in erosion. It is the process of
particle lifting by an agent of erosion.
147. /d.
148. [d. at 13.
149. Jd. The definition of "Government Enforcement Action' in Article 5 of the NAAEC
includes actions 'such as (a) appointing and training inspectors; (b) monitoring compliance and
investigating suspected violations, including through on-site inspections; (c) seeking assurances of
voluntary compliance and compliance agreements; (d) publicly releasing non-compliance
information; (e) issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement procedures; (f)
promoting environmental audits; (g) requiring record keeping and reports; (h) providing or
encouraging mediation and arbitration services; (i) using licenses, permits or authorizations; (j)
initialing in a timely manner judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to seek
appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and regulations; (k)
providing for search, seizure or detention; or (I) issuing administrative orders, including orders of a
preventative, curative or emergency nature."
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providing for the long-term protection of the environment with respect to
fish and fish habitat."15o
Canada asserted that its findings suggested that voluntary compliance,
negotiation, publicity, and persuasion often made more compelling
enforcement unnecessary, that it would continue to pursue different
compliance promotion strategies, and that it would not hesitate to utilize
the full power of its laws to protect fish and fish habitat where it is
deemed necessary. 151 Furthermore, "enforcement through prosecutions
would be a last resort after cooperation and persuasion [had]
failed ... [since] immediate and widespread use of prosecution would be
ineffective and counter productive."152
The Secretariat made a recommendation to the Council to prepare a
factual record since "additional information was required before an
evaluation could be made that Canada was enforcing Section 35(1),"153
and by unanimous vote (Council Resolution 98-07), the Council directed
the Secretariat to prepare a factual record absent matters pending before
the Court of Appeal in British Columbia. l54 In preparing the factual
record, the Secretariat used the information collection methods
prescribed by the NAAEC,155 requested information from the JPAC and
an established expert panel to assist in the process, conferred with
stakeholders prior to submitting its report, developed a scope of injury
report to focus the inquiry, requested additional information from the
JPAC when an insufficiency of information was discovered, and
included a history of hydroelectric projects in British Columbia and their
impact on fish and habitat in the factual record. l56 However, as with the
Cozumel case, no determination was ever made as to whether Canada
was effectively enforcing its environmentallaws. 157
A review of the Cozumel and BC Hydro factual records exposes a mixed
bag of substantive and procedural events driven by the NAAEC

150. [d.
151. [d.
152. [d.

153. The author is somewhat befuddled by this part of the CEC's Lessons Learned Report. As
previously discussed, the recommendation to enable the inclusion in the factual record the
determination of whether a particular environmental law is actually being enforced is on the table.
This statement made by the CEC suggests that the Secretariat was actually intending to make such a
determination, which it never did, and likely never intended to do.
154. See CEC, supra note 50, at 6.
155. This included requesting information from the submitters and Canada in the form of
written and oral testimony, and allowing the stakeholders three months to make written submissions.
156. See CEC, supra note 50, at 7.
157. /d.
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submission process itself. Substantively, what appears to be evident in
these cases is the CEC's exhaustive effort to create a complete and
unbiased record of facts, arguments, law, and supportive expert and
scientific evidence pertaining to each submission.
However,
notwithstanding these many pages of text contained within these two
factual records, some critical questions continue to echo:
- To what extent does the factual record contain valuable
interpretation, processing, and assessment of all the relevant
data?
- Has the role of the CEC in the development of factual records
become one merely of data gathering and limited information
distribution?
- And if so, what then can we expect of the significance and
impact of a factual record given the modest level of substantive
interpretation and evaluation so far included in these factual
records?'58
The Cozumel and BC Hydro cases also emphasize several procedural
issues worth mentioning. In BC Hydro, the confidentiality provisions of
Article 39 and 42 were asserted, relating to the confidentiality of
proprietary information or concerns about national security.'59 BC Hydro
has become typical of the increasing number of responses asserting
similar confidentiality claims, and many commentators have expressed
some concern over the abuse of these provisions. '60 Opportunities to
assert the confidentiality privilege should be clearly and narrowly
defined. 161
Secondly, in both the Cozumel and BC Hydro cases, the Council had the
authority under the NAAEC Article 15(7) to decide by a two-thirds
majority vote whether to make the factual record available to the
public. '62 The power to withhold submission information from the public
has been criticized as being in direct conflict with established

158. The author strongly. agrees with Professor KibeI's recommendation to allow for
conclusions to be drawn by the CEC. If for nothing else, the CEC's level of information gathering,
analysis, and expertise exhibited in these two factual records demonstrate clearly that the CEC's
conclusions would add much value to the factual record, and could be used as the NAFfA parties
saw fit As has already been mentioned, the factual record has no binding legal effect, unlike the
arbitration panels' decisions in the Chapter 11 cases discussed later.
159. [d. at 11.
160. /d.
161. /d.
162. [d.
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international principles of transparency and undermines efforts to build
public confidence in the NAAEC submission process. In the author's
view, provisions should be made within the NAAEC to allow for the
publication of some version of every factual record, absent any sensitive
and confidential information.
In the Cozumel case, the CEC found that ". . . events or acts concluded
prior to January 1, 1994 may create conditions or situations which give
rise to current enforcement obligations. It follows that certain aspects of
these conditions or situations may be relevant when considering an
allegation of a present, continuing failure to enforce environmental
law."163 On the issue of standing and direct injury, the Secretariat noted
the "[importance] of the resource in question" and concluded that the
"public nature of the marine resources [brought] the submitters within
the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the NAAEC."I64 And on the
requirement of exhaustion of remedies, the Secretariat concluded that
"under the circumstances the submitters attempted to pursue local
remedies, primarily by availing themselves of the denuncia popular l65
administrative procedure."I66

Now left with a discussion of how successful the NAFfA Environmental
Framework has been based on the review of recent environmental
studies, for at least two years, environmentalists and other NGO's
demanded that NAFfA should have included requirements for extensive
environmental impact studies before development, and for the imposition
of trade sanctions against companies that failed to comply with
environmental laws. 167 On the one hand, economic studies were
performed prior to NAFTA ratification in an effort to assess the
economic benefits to be gained by the treaty.l68 However, in contrast,
many critical inquiries over the potential environmental effects of
NAFf A were never addressed, contributing to many concerns that
remain unsettled to this day.169 Consequently, most of the NAFfA

163. See Kibei, supra note 9, at 62.
164. Id.
165. Denuncia popular is a "complaint of the people."
166. Id.
167. See Baker and McKenzie, supra note 3, at 248.
168. Along with studies already cited, at least one government study by the rrc, "EconomyWide Modeling of the Economic Implications of a FfA with Mexico and a NAFfA with Canada
and Mexico," is mentioned by the General Secretariat, supra note 22, Ch. 1, Pt. 2, at 9.
169. A few environmental studies were conducted prior to NAFfA. (For example, see G.M.
Grossman and A.B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a Nonh American Free Trade Agreement, in
THE MEXICO-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (P. Barder ed., Cambridge MIT Press 1993); however,
none were ever required by NAFfA.
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environmental studies are now being performed in hindsight, perhaps
after some irreversible damage has already been done. 170
In the words of the CEC Secretariat, "changes in human health can serve
as an indicator of change in the ambient environment."171 Following this
line of reasoning, the author will therefore start the discussion on
NAFf A environmental effects with a public citizen report, which among
other things alleges that the high NAFf A price tag regrettably includes
human casualties. The public citizen report is also offered first simply
because analysis on the human element of the NAFfAlenvironment
connection is missing from almost all of the reports that were reviewed
for this paper.172 While the author will not try to guess the reason as to
why this dimension was seemingly overlooked, it is not hard to argue
that human concerns are also important when attempting to assess the
post-NAFfA state of the environment. A short discussion on the CEC's
"Analytical Framework For Assessing Environmental Effects" also

170. The issue of the insufficiency of environmental studies was brought up at the NACEC
First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade and Environment
held on October 11 and 12, 2000 in Washington D.C. In the Closing Session, Konrad von Moltke,
Senior Advisor for the International Institute for Sustainable Development commented that the
NACEC needed to find better incentives to promote more and better studies by the academic
community on this subject so that the NACEC could "draw on them." However, one academic
commentator suggested that the political responsibility and burden is on the CEC to initiate and
produce these studies. This finger pointing tends to support the view that NAFfA should have
required environmental impact studies. In addition, one of the studies to be discussed later was very
critical of CEC environmental testing "after the fact." See Christine Elwell, LL.B., LL. M., Sierra
Club of Canada, NAFfA Effects on Water: Testing for NAFfA Effects in the Great Lakes Basin,
CEC - First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages Between Trade and
Environment - Papers, at http;:lIwww.cec.orglsymposium. According to the study, "if trade
liberalization is truly to progress without significant damage to the environment, it is not enough to
create a CEC Framework for testing NAFfA effects that can identify and perhaps even mitigate
damaging processes that are already underway. The environmental impact assessment process
should incorporate models of testing a process prior to initiation, and it should have standards by
which to judge actions that will have an effect on the environment. Given that no detailed indicators
are in place six years after the acceptance of NAFfA indicate that the general statements of desire
for sustainable development in NAFfA are an accession to a minority of concern."
171. See Assessing Environmental Effects of the Nonh American Free Trade Agreement - An
Analytical Framework (Phase II) and Issues Studies, supra note 118, at 37.
172. The CEC website has a whole section devoted to Pollutants and Health at
http://www.cec.orglprograms_projects/pollutants_health. My point concerns whether environmental
harm and human harm can and should be completely separated and reported in this manner, since
they too are linked. Some inconsistencies were encountered as a result of this health/environment
division. For example, one environmental report concludes that no environmental harm has been
caused by NAFfA in the U.S. Yet this whole CEC section deals with health problems caused by
NAFfA environmental pollution. At a minimum, shouldn't environmental reports comment on, or
try to reconcile the results of their studies with any applicable findings related to health? Or does the
precise nature of academic studies provide justification for not reporting on this connection when
human health is not the topic?
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follows the public citizen report,173 since the framework has provided a
sound methodology for the development of some recent environmental
studies. And finally, an analysis and summary of these important
environmental studies concludes this section.
Public Citizen alleges NAFf A failures in protecting the environment,
public health, and enforcing the NAFfA environmental provisions. 174
Not entirely inconsistent with the studies to be discussed later, Public
Citizen further alleges:
- A 37 % increase in border maquiladoras at the NAFf A fiveyear mark, leading to increased air and water pollution, and
devastating population growth not sustainable under the current
infrastructure;
- A 50 % increase in hazardous waste transports into the United
States since 1996, expected to increase as the number of
maquiladoras continues to climb under NAFfA;
- Increased toxic waste dumping, much
maquiladora waste still unaccounted for;

of which

IS

- Lack of promised clean up of 6,000 metric tons of lead
remaining at the Metales y Derivados cite in Tijuana, owned by
San Diego-based New Frontier Trading Corp.:
- Lack of sewage treatment to handle a 54 % increase in the
population of the city of Juarez, based on NAFfA growth;
- Increased air pollution on the U.S.-Mexican border due to a
surge in truck traffic with a 19 % increase in traffic at the Texas
border, and doubling of the number of trucks entering the U.S. at
San Diego.
But perhaps more importantly, the public Cluzen report alleges that
NAFfA has also caused large increases in Hepatitis A outbreaks due to
contamination of the Rio Grande River, border birth defect clusters
which are almost twice the national average in Cameron County, Texas,
and an increase in birth defects at the Cameron CountylMatamoros

173. In all fairness, it appears that the Public Citizen Report did not follow the standards set
forth in the CEC Analytical Framework. For one reason, the CEC Analytical Framework was not
available when this study was done. Secondly, it is likely that the authors of the study were not
concerned about waiting for a framework that was six-plus years in the making in order to perform a
study on NAFfA environmental effects that could have been performed at any time.
174. See Public Citizen, supra note 34, at I, 2.
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border correlated to increased industrial activity under N AFf A. 175 By the
Secretariat's own threshold standard, these human health problems lend
credence to the view that the NAFfA environmental record is not
entirely without blemish, and that these problems need to be remedied,
especially because of their dangerous effects on human health.
In an effort "to contribute to an increased understanding of the possible
effects of trade and related economic and institutional developments in
North America," the CEC established a trilateral team of independent
representatives from the three countries to develop an analytical
framework for considering the environmental effects of NAFfA.176 The
Council reported that "it is very important to note that any effort to
determine the linkages between a trade agreement's provisions and
environmental effects is an extremely difficult challenge."m In Phase I
of the project beginning in 1995, the team focused on understanding the
NAFfA trade and investment regime, and developing a preliminary
analytic approach.t78 Phase n, the latest published report, builds on Phase
I, "refined through extensive review and consultation."t79

The CEC study first examines four major areas that can affect the natural
environment, including the environmental context, the economic context,
the social context, and the geographic context. lSO In the "NAFfA
Connection" the study then examines the NAFf A components that relate
to a particular issue, including NAFfA changes, NAFfA institutions,
trade flows, transborder investment flows, and other economic
conditioning factors. 181 The CEC study also examines "linkages to the
environment," including production, management and technology,
physical infrastructure, social organization, and government policy. 182
The CEC study then recommends the identification of specific indicators
that would be most useful in measuring NAFfA-induced effects. 183
These indicators should include atmospheric quality indicators
measuring urban air quality, acid rain, climate change and ozone
depletion. Water quality indicators measuring water quality and quantity

175. /d. at 10.
176. See Assessing Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement - An
Analytical Framework (Phase II) and Issues Studies, supra note 118, at iv.
177. Id.
178. Id. at v.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id. at 16.
182. [d. at 27.
183. [d. at 37.
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in water ranging from irrigation to drinking water, and the measurement
of pesticides and fertilizers, should also be included. Soil indicators
should include those that measure soil erosion, soil runoff, fertilizer and
pesticide buildup, and land overuse. l84 But perhaps the most important
indicators suggested by the CEC study are those that measure biota,
including species depletion, number of species at risk, rural to urban
conversion of land, and forest indicators.
The author's assessment of the CEC Analytic Framework is that there is
little question that the study is comprehensive, based on work performed
by a cross-national selection of experts and world-renowned authorities.
The issues examined in the study are important to the understanding and
development of a thorough process for measuring environmental harm. 18S
The study will be helpful in many ways, not only for use in the
evaluation of the NAFr A environment, but for future trade agreements
that can utilize all or parts of the environmental framework as a model
for their own assessments. But more importantly, one of the most
valuable parts of the CEC study is the recommendations for
improvement, which offer immediate and future recommendations to
help preserve the environment.
The North American Commission of Environmental Cooperation put the
CEC Analytical Framework to work when it released its study in 1999,
and solicited a public call for papers that resulted in the "First North
American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade
and Environment." The call for papers yielded 14 studies that were
selected from 50 responses, and were presented at this symposium on
October 11 and 12, 2000, at the World Bank in Washington D.C.186
These papers highlight many important issues that are discussed below.
B.
RECENT ACADEMIC CRITICISM OF THE CEC PROCESS AND
NAFr A CHAPTER 11 BASED ON NAFr A ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
In the short time that the CEC analytical framework has been available,

the environmental studies submitted to the CEC have already shed light
on the overall NAAEC submission process and Chapter 11, and provide

184. [d. at 39.
185. Some commentators have recommended changes to the CEC Analytical Framework. A
few of these recommendations are discussed in Part Vll. One area of concern is the addition of
environmental indices that better reflect the overall condition of the environment.
186. See CEC - First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between
Highlights
from
the
Symposium,
at
Trade
and
Environment
http://www.cec.org/symposium/index.cfm.
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some insight into the next generation of NAFfNenvironment issues that
need to be addressed. Of little surprise to many, most of the questions
highlighted by the CEC studies have begged for answers since NAFfA's
inception. That is, for the most part, these studies validate concerns that
have been on record for quite some time. Likely, the next steps taken by
the NAFfA governments to mitigate the environmental impact of
NAFfA will include monitoring the extent of these problems, and
hopefully taking immediate action against those problems that are more
severe.
A review of the studies presented at the CEC's first symposium has
revealed (1) the existence of more evidence concerning the current
difficulties encountered when developing environmental measures within
the context of NAFfA and WTO trade law,181 (2) the constraints that
NAFf A has placed on the ability of countries to adopt higher standards
to protect human health and the environment because of Chapter 11,188 (3)
the non-enforcement of environmental regulations in Mexico in at least
one case study, supporting the pre-NAFfA predictions of many NAFfA
critics,l89 and (4) the existence of a loophole that has already been stated
many times in this paper - that environmentally necessary legislation
may not exist,l90 thereby rendering the NAAEC submission process
useless against these types of environmental abuses.
With regard to Chapter 11, one study suggests that broader disciplines
and wider interpretations of the NAFfA parties' investment obligations
under Chapter 11 have increased the risk that environmental regulations

187. See Howard Mann, International and Environmental Law and Policy, Ottawa, Canada, and
Associate, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Trade and Investment Program,
Assessing the Impact of NAFfA on Environmental Law and Management Processes, CEC - First
North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade and Environment Papers, at http://www.cec.org/symposium.
188. See Marisa Jacott, La Neta; Proyecto Emisiones, Cyrus Reed, Texas Center for Policy
Studies, and Mark Winfield, Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, The Generation
and Management of Hazardous Wastes and Transboundory Hazardous Waste Shipments between
Mexico, Canada, and the United States, 1990-2000, CEC - First North American Symposium on
Understanding
the Linkages
between Trade and
Environment
Papers,
at
http://www.cec.org/symposium.
189. See Andrea Abel, National Zwildlife Federation, and Travis Philips, The University of
Texas at Austin, The Relocation of El Paso's Garment Stonewashing Industry and its Implications
for Trade and Environment, CEC - First North American Symposium on Understanding the
Linkages between Trade and Environment - Papers, at http://www.cec.org/symposium.
190. See Maria Teresa Guerrero and Francisco de Villa, Comision de Solidaridad y Defensa de
los Derechos Humanos, A.C. and Mary Kelly, Cyrus Reed, and Brandon Vegter, Texas Center for
Policy Studies, Austin Texas, The Forestry Industry in the State of Chihuahua; Economic.
Ecological and Social Impacts post-NAFfA, CEC - First North American Symposium on
Understanding the
Linkages
between Trade and
Environment
Papers, at
http;//www.cec.org/symposium.
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will not survive NAFfA and WTO trade law challenges. '91 However,
this study optimistically suggests that developing environmental
regulations that are valid under evolving trade law is possible, since there
are no inherent inconsistencies between the two requirements. 192 Lastly,
this study recommends that NAFf A Chapter 11 does not have to be
changed to address the increasing scope and negative effect on
environmental law of many of these investment provisions. 193 Rather,
interpretive language could be inserted to clarify the meaning of these
terms (i.e., expropriation, performance requirements, etc.).I94 Along these
same lines, the author would further recommend investigating the
possibility of using interpretive language to clarify other parts of the
NAFfA instrument so that other necessary environmental regulations
can more easily be implemented under those provisions. '95
Another study provides more evidence that Chapter 11 is stifling the
development of environmentally necessary legislation. '96 By examining
the movement of hazardous waste between the NAFT A parties, this
study suggests that U.S. waste exports to Canada and Quebec have
dramatically increased (partially because of a weakened regulatory

191. See Mann, supra note 187, at 1.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. /d.
195. Using a constitutional law tenn to make this point, domestic environmental measures in
the backdrop of international agreements have often been ruled invalid because of "strict scrutiny"
interpretations made by trade tribunals. That is, in most cases, the purpose of the environmental
regulation and the method of addressing that particular purpose is so "strictly scrutinized" that the
environmental regulation is almost never found consistent with trade law. For example, see NAFfA
Chapter Twenty-One: Exceptions, Article 2101(2), which states that "such [environmental measures
and those measures outlined in Article 2101(1)] [are General Exceptions to the NAFfA Agreement]
provided that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of
ARBITRARY or UNJUSTIFIABLE discrimination . . . ." In the author's view, trade tribunals
should take more into consideration the need for an environmental regulation when evaluating the
alleged violator's method of addressing that need (i.e., when balancing interests). For instance, an
environmental regulation instituted to protect the lives of citizens against an extremely dangerous
chemical should not first and foremost be viewed as potentially discriminatory against foreign
countries under Article 2101(2), and therefore invalid when determining whether the environmental
or health regulation is justified under NAFfA trade law. The lives of citizens (i.e., the need for the
regulation), and not the rights of foreign corporations should clearly carry more weight (or at least
some weight) in this determination. In another example, NAFfA Article 1207 describes the use of
"Quantitative Restrictions" between the parties. Quantitative restrictions are clearly discriminatory,
yet the need to protect particular industries was considered important enough by the NAFfA parties
to warrant discrimination in some cases. Protection of human life and the environment should also
be considered important enough to balance in favor of environmental protection against some
limited, and warranted discrimination. Therefore, perhaps an agreed-upon, more environmentally
conscious interpretation of "ARBITRARY or JUSTIFIABLE discrimination" could be included in
NAFfA to allow for the implementation of these types of necessary environmental and healthregulated regulations.
196. See Jacott et aI., supra note 188, at 1.
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environment in those provinces) and that the development of higher
standards to protect human health and the environment has been
constrained because of the Chapter 11 Ethyl and Metalclad cases. 191 This
study supports the conclusions of many critics based on recent
developments in the Chapter 11 cases discussed in Part VI.
Other CEC studies reveal at least three NAAEC submission process
weaknesses. One study of the relocation of El Paso's Garment
Stonewashing Industry found that the existence of lower labor costs in
Mexico was the overriding factor influencing relocation. 198 However, the
lack of industrial pretreatment regulatory enforcement in Mexico has
clouded this issue, since the amount of influence that this lack of
enforcement had in the relocation decision is not known. While of
greater concern is determining the scope of industry relocation attracted
by the lack of environmental enforcement in Mexico, this study verifies
one NAAEC submission process problem that has already been stated
many times in this paper - that not all environmental enforcement
violations are being reported and submitted to the CEC.
Another study done on the Forestry Industry in the State of Chihuahua
found that increases in U.S. imports of pulp and paper exerted pressure
on the Chihuahua producers to keep prices low to maintain market share,
and to oppose environmental regulations that increase the cost of doing
business. l99 This study is important because it identifies two more
conditions that the NAAEC submission process will not remedy; (1) the
,-, exertion of political pressure NOT to establish environmentally
necessary legislation; and (2) the CEC's inability to address
environmental abuses based on environmental legislation that does not
exist.
In summary, a review of the first round of CEC studies has uncovered
some evidence of potential CEC submission process and NAFTA
Chapter 11 shortcomings that have long been voiced. In the author's
view, more studies are required to discover the extent of the
environmental non-enforcement problem occurring in Mexico, the
amount and severity of environmental abuses taking place due to the lack
of adequate environmental regulations, and the level of economic and/or
political pressures being exerted to suppress environmentally necessary
legislation. However, the CEC studies are more conclusive in showing

197. [d.
198. See Abel & Philips, supra note 189, at 1.
199. !d.
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that immediate action needs to be taken to remedy the effects of recent
Chapter 11 cases to allow for the development of stronger environmental
regulations in the shipment of hazardous wastes, and in other areas
concerning human health and the environment.
VI. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF CRITICAL NAFfA
CHAPTER 11 CASES
Given the right to directly challenge a NAFf A party, an investor may
request binding investor-to-state dispute resolution for monetary
damages. Under NAFfA's dispute settlement provisions (contained in
NAFfA Chapter 11, Section B), each disputing party may select an
arbitrator from the tribunal membership, and a third arbitrator is selected
by an arbitration body. However, since arbitration proceedings under
Chapter 11 do not follow the established international norms of
transparency, proceedings may secretly be withheld from the public,
even though domestic taxpayers are ultimately held responsible for
paying out any damages awarded. 201l Therefore, except for cases made
available by unofficial publication, it is unclear as to who and how many
Chapter 11 challenges have actually been initiated and/or settled. 201
What is clear about the known cases is that they have stirred Chapter 11
critics to become increasingly concerned about two major problems: 202
That Chapter 11 can undermine efforts to enact new laws and
regulations in the public interest, in particular to protect the
environment and human health; and

200. Konrad von Moltke, Senior Advisor of the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, most accurately described this situation in the closing session of the CEC First Annual
Symposium cited earlier: "[with regard to Chapterll] we don't know how to know what we need to
know . . . ." Furthermore under the Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement Process, there are limited
opportunities to appeal or review a decision. See Mann, supra note 8, at 11.
201. See The Council Of Canadians, NAFfA's Big Brother: The Free Trade Area of the
Americas and the Threat Of NAFTA-style 'Investor-State' Rules, March 20, 2001, at 2. This source
also claims that only fifteen Chapter 11 cases have been made pUblic.
202. See Mann, supra note 8, at 1. At least one participant of the CEC's First Annual
Symposium somewhat disagreed with some of the current concerns over NAFfA Chapter 11.
Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Economics, stated at the Symposium's
closing session that he believes that a more thorough and complete understanding of the decisions in
the Chapter II cases is required, and that anecdotal evidence such as provisions that have a "chilling
effect on environmental regulations" is persuasive in nature, but not hard evidence appropriate for
academic studies.
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That Chapter 11 can require governments to pay
compensation to polluters to stop polluting, even if their
activities have an adverse impact on public health and welfare.
In fact, as of March 2001, there have been ten cases brought against
environmental and natural resource management measures, including
cases involving hazardous waste management decisions, maintenance of
clean drinking water, and gasoline additives barred in other
jurisdictions.203 The NAFfA parties recognized these concerns earlier,
and by June 1999, efforts were being made to discuss NAFTA Chapter
11 among the NAFTA environment ministers (i.e., the governing council
to the CEC).204 And by the end of 2000, trade ministers and tradefocused observers were recognizing the problems as well.lOs But as of
this writing, nothing has been made available on the CEC website
explaining the status or content of any current talks on possible Chapter
11 modifications, or the prospects for making any of these recommended
changes.206

Available data was reviewed for five cases, and a synopsis of each case
is included here to illustrate the extensive rights of NAFfA investors and
their overreaching effect on the NAFTA parties. Two disputes involve
the United States, one dispute involves Mexico, and two disputes involve
Canada.
Among these cases, three investors attacked domestic
environmental regulations (Ethyl, Metalclad, and Methanex), one
investor attacked a public agency (UPS), and one investor attacked a·
Party's sovereign domestic judicial system (the Loewen Group). Both
U.S. cases bring up U.S. constitutionality issues, which are discussed in
Part VII.
The two non-environment cases (Loewen and UPS) are included here to
illustrate their effects on public health and safety. The decisions in these
two cases may provide more ammunition for foreign investors to attack
even more environmental regulations in the years to come.

203. [d. at 15. •
204. [d. at 16.
205. [d. In his response to questions submitted to him specifically for this paper on June 12,
2001, Scott Vaughan, the head of the Environment, Economy and Trade Program at the CEC has
verified that recommendations to revise Chapter 11 have come from all three NAFfA parties, and
from various NGO's including the Sierra Club of Canada, and the Institute of Sustainable
Development.
206. The CEC website is located at http://www.cec.org, although it is unclear whether Chapter
II issues/events would be posted there based on the NAFfA parties' stance on keeping Chapter 11
and NAAEC environmental issues separate. (See discussion on page 19.)
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In Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (Notice of Arbitration: April 14, 1997),
the first suit initiated under NAFf A Chapter 11 ,207 Ethyl, a Virginia
corporation, fIled a claim against Canada for $250 million in damages.
Ethyl produces a toxic gasoline additive called methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese tricarbonyl ("MMT"), and then ships the substance to
Canada, where it is mixed and sold to Canadian gas refiners. In April
1997, Canada imposed a ban on the import and inter-provincial trade of
MMT, which was intended to protect public health, since MMT contains
manganese, a known human neurotoxin. 208 The law did not directly ban
the sale or use of MMT in Canada, urging some to argue that the law was
discriminatory. 209
Under the NAFfA provisions, Ethyl claimed that Canada's ban on MMT
amounted to "expropriation" under Article 110 because it would
eliminate profits Ethyl expected to earn through Canadian sales of the
additive. 210 Ethyl further alleged that the ban was an illegal "performance
requirement" under Article 1106 because it would force the company to
build a factory in every Canadian province since the regulation made
importation of MMT illegal.211 And finally, Ethyl alleged that Canada's
ban on MMT in the absence of a ban on internal production and sale was
a breach of its obligation to treat foreign and domestic investors in a no
less favorable manner under Article 1102.212
In July 1998, Canada settled with Ethyl,213 agreeing to several troubling

conditions. Under the settlement decree, Canada ended up paying Ethyl
Corporation $13 million for lost costs and profits, removed the ban on
MMT, and made a public apology to Ethyl for implying that Ethyl's
product was hazardous. 214 In essence, Ethyl was able to intimidate
Canadian lawmakers into rescinding a valid environmental regulation,
which resulted in the Canadian taxpayer "paying off the polluter" for
importing a dangerous chemical.215 The use of Chapter 11 to lobby

207. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Another Broken NAFfA Promise: Challenge by
U.S.
Corporation
Leads
Canada
to
Repeal
Public
Health
Law,
at
2,
httpllwww.citizen.org!pctradeJnaftalcases/ethyl.htm.
208. See NAFfA's Corporate Lawsuits, A Briefing Paper, Friends Of The Earth and Public
Citizen. April 1999, at 2; http/!:www.tradewatch.orgINAFTNCases/fancy.pdf.This source further
states that both the EPA and the State of California have also banned the use of MMT, lending
credence to the view that the Canadian ban on MMT was legitimate.
209. See Mann, supra note 8, at 71.
210. See Public Citizen, supra note 207, at 2.
211. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen. supra note 208, at 2.
212. See Mann, supra note 8, at 71.
213. [d.
214. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 2.
215. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 2.
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against valid environmental legislation in this case set a major precedent
for the cases to follow.216
Mexico (Notice of Arbitration: January 13, 1997), an
American corporation filed a Chapter 11 claim against Mexico for $90
million.217 Metalclad took over a waste disposal plant facility in San Luis
Potosi, which had history of contaminating local groundwater. 218 The
company had hopes of building and operating a full hazardous waste
landfill facility, for which municipal permits for that purpose had been
previously denied.219 The federal government in Mexico issued the
required permits from that level, without prejudice to other
authorizations that might be required at the local level, and promised the
company that all permits were either issued or would be issued without a
problem. 220

In Metalclad

V.

a

Local citizens, concerned about the government's failure to impose
environmental laws and regulations, opposed Metalclad's plans to reopen and continue running the disposal plant. 221 The required municipal
permits were finally denied in December 1995, thus ending the final
construction and preventing any operation of the landfill.222 Because of
the locals' involvement and concern, the state governor then declared the
site part of an ecological zone. 223
Metalclad, claiming that the governor's declaration amounted to
"expropriation" under Article 1110,224 sued Mexico for $90 million, an
amount that is more than the combined annual income of all the residents
in the surrounding area. 225 The company also alleged that Article 1105
was violated. 226 The Tribunal decided in favor of Metalclad (awarding

216. See Mann, supra note 8, at 74.
217. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Our Future Under the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, at 2, http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafialcases/metalcla.htm.
218. [d.
219 .. See Mann, supra note 8, at 74.
220. [d.
221. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 5.
222. See Mann, supra note 8, at 75.
223. See WTO - The NAFTA Ruling On MetalClad vs. Mexico, at 4.
224. The NAFTA Tribunal ruled that Article 1110 was violated because no compensation was
paid; expropriation could include "covert or incidental interference with the use of property;" and the
purpose of the government measure need not be considered in this regard. See Mann, supra note 8,
at 77.
225. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 3.
226. The Tribunal ruled that Article 1105 was breached in several ways including not living up
to federal and state official representations; not clarifying understandings of Mexican law; not
having procedures for investors to easily know the rules on permits - breaching the transparency
obligations in non-Chapter II parts of NAFTA; ruling that environmental factors were a federal and
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them $16.7 million in damages on August 30,2000) citing three NAFfA
objectives that needed to be adhered to227, and even went so far as to
proclaim that environmental impact considerations, public opinions, and
the past record of performance of the proponent were matters outside the
jurisdiction of Mexican local government.228
The Tribunal further ruled that Mexican officials told Metalclad that
municipal permits were not necessary to build or operate the landfill,
despite Mexican submissions that no such assurances were offered, and
that the company relied upon and acted on these representations. 229
Furthermore, the NAFfA Tribunal held this proceeding in secrecy, did
not allow testimony from local people or environmental experts, and did
not even allow the concerned parties to review the original arguments
filed by Metalclad.230
The Tribunal's ruling in Metalclad has brought several critical Chapter
11 issues to the forefront. In particular,231
- What is the extent of the transparency and other procedural
requirements to be accorded an investor under Article 1105?
- Do the decisions of government officials at one level have a
binding effect on officials at another level with regard to
NAFfA investors?
- What is the scope of the Tribunal's ability to rule on domestic
law?
- What effect does the need to consider the purpose of a
measure have on the determination of "expropriation"?
The answers to these questions will likely impact future NAFfA Chapter
11 cases for years to come.

not a local issue; and not notifying Metalclad of the relevant town meeting concerning its permit.
(See Howard Mann, supra note, 8 at 75.) Also, these types of Chapter II decisions can be
contrasted with the CEC's reluctance to make detenninations on environmental enforcement.
227. The three NAFfA objectives on which the Tribunal based its opinion are transparency in
government regulations and activity; the substantial increase in investment opportunities; and the
assurance of a predictable commercial framework for investors. See Mann, supra note 8, at 75.
228. See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 4.
229. See Mann, supra note 8, at 75.
230. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 4. The Tribunal justified
this secrecy citing the need for effective operation of the proceedings. See Mann, supra note 8, at
77.
231. See Mann, supra note 8, at 78.
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In UPS V. Canada (Notice of Arbitration: April 19, 2000), UPS, the giant
U.S. courier company, accused the Canada Post of giving preferential
access to its national network, and alleged $156 million in damages.2.l2
UPS is alleging an Article 1102 violation because Canada Post does not
provide UPS with access to its retail and service infrastructure that is
equal to what it provides its own courier operations. 23J UPS is also
alleging an Article 1105 violation because the government is using its
courier monopoly to engage in anti-competitive practices towards its
competitors. 214 Furthermore, UPS is alleging that Canada itself has
violated NAFfA Article 1503 by failing to effectively control its own
government monopolies. m
According to trade lawyer Steven Shrybman, UPS is using NAFfA to
expand its corporate empire by eliminating public sector competition for
mail and courier services. 236 UPS is claiming that the Canada Post has
taken unfair advantage of its mail service monopoly to support its
competitive parcel and courier delivery business, which occurs today in
most areas of public sector service delivery.237 In fact, most private sector·
corporations have been complaining for decades about "unfair
competition" from public service providers. 238 .
However, if UPS succeeds in having one public sector monopoly
declared invalid under NAFfA Chapter 11, this would provide ample
ammunition for other investors to attack a wide range of public
infrastructures including Medicare, education, transportation, sewer and
water services, and dozens of other public services. 239 Consequently,
UPS's efforts could dramatically expand the ambit of the investor-state
apparatus to include NAFfA requirements that should not be subject to
foreign investor claims.240
The environmental link between the UPS case and the topic of this paper
is that the increased exposure of public monopolies to Chapter 11 claims
may limit the very use of these public infrastructures by their NAFfA
party owners, thereby leading to less controlled and less standardized
public services. The potential development of a more chaotic, lower232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 5.
See Mann, supra note 8, at 107.
/d.

[d.

See The Council Of Canadians, supra note 201, at 5.
[d.
[d.
[d.

[d.
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quality, foreign-investor infested public service sector could lead to
disastrous environmental, public health, and public welfare
consequences.
Canadian companies have not excluded themselves from attempting to
exploit NAFTA investor protections. In Methanex v. U.S. (Notice of
Arbitration: December 3, 1999), Methanex, a Vancouver-based company
that produces methanol, is suing the U.S. for $970 million over a
California decision to phase out the use of MTBE, one of the company's
products, by 2002.241 California issued its phase-out decision after
discovering that MTBE was leaking into the ground water of Santa
Monica and Lake Tahoe, and into 10,000 wells throughout California. 242
California also cited an EPA report that MTBE causes tumors in rats.243
Methanex is now claiming that the California phase-out amounts to
expropriation under Article 1110 due to the company's loss of expected
future business profits, and the $150 million loss of Methanex stock
value in the ten days following California's announcement. 244 The
Methanex case falls in line with other NAFT A disputes attempting to
capitalize on the expanded meaning of "expropriation" within the
NAFT A legal sense.
Methanex is also claiming the U.S. violated Article 1102 based on the
assertions that Archer-Daniels-Midland, a competitor that manufactures
ethanol, a product that now stands to gain from the MTBE ban,
contributed to the campaign of the current California Governor. This led
to Governor Gray Davis' successful advocacy of the MTBE ban, and
thus created a discriminatory process and outcome. 245
Furthermore, Methanex is claiming that the U.S. violated Article 1105,
stating that: 246
- The MTBE ban was the result of a flawed process in which it
was denied due process leading to a failure to consider
alternatives on banning MTBE;

241. [d.
242. [d.
243. [d.

244. [d.
245. See Mann, supra note 8, at 97.
246. [d.
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- Unfair and non-transparent lobbying determined the decision;
and
- The measure was a disguised restriction on trade that was not
the least trade-restrictive option available.
A NAFTA Tribunal hearing on an amended Methanex claim, and the
U.S.'s objection to jurisdiction, was anticipated for June 2001,247 the
results of which are not known at the time of this writing.
Finally in Loewen Group, Inc. V. U.S. (Notice of Arbitration: October 30,
1998), Loewen, a Canadian-based funeral conglomerate, is suing the
U.S. for $725 million claiming that a Mississippi trial judge, verdict,
bond requirement, and trial decision upheld by the Mississippi Supreme
Court has violated the company's new investor rights guaranteed under
NAFT A Chapter 1l,248 Loewen was sued by a small Mississippi funeral
home owner for gross business misconduct. 249 The Mississippi jury
found Loewen liable for fraud, malicious business practices, and other
misconduct, and imposed heavy punitive damages. Loewen settled the
case for $150 million and promptly filed a $725 million suit against the
U.S. in the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID"), claiming NAFT A Chapter 11 violations. 250
Loewen alleges that the civil justice system in Mississippi violated
international legal norms of "fairness," discriminating against the
Canadian-based corporation. This amounts to "expropriation" (Article
1110) and the "denial of justice" (Article 1102), both NAFTA Chapter
11 violations. 251 Loewen further claims that the Mississippi Supreme
Court requirement for Loewen to post a 125% bond as applicable under
state law also violated NAFTA by not specially exempting the company
from the law. 252 In essence, Loewen is claiming that the very civil justice

247. See Mann, supra note 8, at 96. The Methanex Chapter 11 case should not be confused
with the Methanex CEC Submission (99-001), which has an entirely different disposition.
248. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 5.
249. /d.
250. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Briefing Paper, Canadian Corporation Found
Liable in Mississippi Couns Uses NAFTA to Claim Legal System Violated Its Rights; at 1,
http://www.citizen.orglpctradeinaftalcases!Loewen.htm.
251. Id. at 2.
252. [d. This bond requirement has been implemented in at least 20 other states so that the
lengthy appeal process is not abused, and violating parties are not given the opportunity to hide
assets. Loewen further claimed that the court's refusal to exempt the company from the bond, or
even lower the bond amount, violated Article 1105, Minimum National Standards of Treatment. See
Mann, supra note 8, at 104.
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system itself - allowing jury trials - is violating the company's NAFfAguaranteed rights to fair and equal treatment and non-discrimination. 253
If Loewen is successful in its claim against the United States, investors
would be encouraged to try to circumvent domestic law by filing
NAFfA claims challenging the state, local, and federal court systems,
where U.S. citizens and businesses must abide by U.S. court rulings. 254
Additionally, the Loewen case could effectively put an end to punitive
damages against NAFfA investors 25s, while foreign investors and their
political allies could use NAFf A rights to fuel efforts to enact tort
"reform" that further restricts citizens' access to the court systems.256
These consequences could have a major impact on both NAFf A and
domestic environmental litigation. Domestically, under one scenario, a
NAFf A foreign investor could try to use Chapter 11 to shield itself from
punitive damages assessed for severe environmental pollution. And
within the NAFfA framework, using Chapter 11, a foreign investor
might try to circumvent punitive damages sought by a NAFfA party
through the domestic enforcement of environmental violations brought
about by NAAEC submissions, which could render the NAAEC
submission process ineffective in these cases.
The determinations in all of the five cases described above challenge the
effectiveness and fairness of the NAFfA investment provisions, and
draw attention to special issues that need to be addressed in order to
make NAFf A most beneficial to all stakeholders. While the Chapter 11
investment protections have acted as an effective catalyst fostering many
investment opportunities throughout the NAFf A territories, these
protections should not be extended so far as to destroy necessary health,
environmental, and judicial policies that protect the NAFf A citizens
themselves. Part vn summarizes these problems and describes some
possible solutions.

253. /d. The author believes it is more accurate that some jury determinations - not jury trials
themselves - could violate an investor's NAFfA guaranteed rights. However, even with this
qualification, this result seems unacceptable. (I.e., NAFfA rights should not exempt foreign
investors from the U.S. legal process.)
254. See Friends Of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 5. Also note that NAFfA
creates a special right of appeal outside the U.S. legal system for any corporation that can define
itself as foreign.
255. See Public Citizen Global Trade Watch - Briefing Paper, Canadian Corporation Found
liable in Mississippi Courts Uses NAFFA to Claim Legal System Violated Its Rights, at 3.
256. See Friends of The Earth and Public Citizen, supra note 208, at 5.
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VII. CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The constitutional validity of the NAFT A dispute resolution, especially
under Chapter 11, Section B, is still open for debate. One concern is the
extended meaning of "expropriation" in the NAFTA sense, and whether
this interpretation can withstand U.S. constitutional scrutiny, where the
meaning of "expropriation" (i.e., "takings" under the Fifth Amendment)
is far more limited. Secondly, an issue arises as to whether a
multinational review panel can replace ordinary judicial review, the
decisions of which are never appealable to a U.S. COurt.257 Since
members of the arbitration panel are chosen by the involved nations, the
transfer of appellate jurisdiction to this arbitration panel from Article ill
courts raises serious questions about whether this process deprives
litigants of judicial review by an Article ill court,258 as dictated by the
Constitution.
Thirdly, the mandatory nature of NAFT A arbitration coupled with the
secrecy of the proceedings and lack of transparency raises potential due
process violations based on lack of "notice" and "opportunity to be
heard," and the deprivation of a "full" and "fair" trial. In particular, there
are no requirements to provide the public with information at various
stages of the process, such as the notice of intent to litigate, the
consultation process, or the initiation of litigation. 259 In addition,
governments are not required to make public the pleadings of the parties,
and can even maintain secrecy of final awards. 260
In essence, negotiation of commercial disputes under NAFT A has
extended into public policy negotiations, which take place solely
between the government and foreign investors in a privileged and secret
context. 261 This gives foreign private interests an unhealthy privileged
access to the policy-making process, without the accountability that
comes from public release of the pleadings. 262

Aside from the constitutional issues specific to the U.S. that will be
determined in their own due course, cross-national recommendations
have been proposed by several critics that are surprisingly similar in

257. See JACKSON, DAVEY, & SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC
RELATIONS 493 (West Publishing Company 1995).
258. [d.
259. [d.
260. [d.
261. [d.
262. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol8/iss1/6

44

Nogales: NAFTA Environmental Framework

2002]

NAFf A ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK

141

content and nature, perhaps due to the equal opportunity effort on record
of companies from all three NAFf A parties seeking to maximize and
exploit the benefits of NAFfA purely for their own personal gain. These
recommendations along with some comments are summarized below:
Eliminate the investor-state mechanism, which enables investors to
bypass domestic court systems.
Limit international commercial
arbitration procedures to their intended purpose - to the adjudication of
contract disputes, where the parties expressly consent to the specific
dispute to arbitration. 263
Comments: This suggestion amounts to "throwing the baby out with the
bath water." The author's view is that there are less destructive steps that
can be taken to preserve the positive effects of this mechanism, such as
the ones mentioned below.
"Carve-out" (reserve an exception) for environmental protection, natural
resource management, and conservation measures, by specifying
"Notwithstanding ~y other provisions of the Agreement, a contracting
party shall not be prevented from taking prudential measures with respect
to environmental protection, resource management and conservation, and
related health protection matters."264
Comments: Since Article 1106 and 1110 already contain some of these
exceptions, the recommendation is to re-interpret and extend the use of
these exceptions, and develop better and more specific language (perhaps
with the language stated above) to allow for the proper exercise of these
exceptions. Interpretive language to clarify: National treatment in the
environmental context, the relationship between environmental trade
measures and performance requirements prohibited by NAFf A, and the
scope of expropriation is likely a better alternative, since this would not
require modifying Chapter 11.265
"Carve-out" (reserve an exception) for measures related to health,
education, and social services, to the effect that "Notwithstanding any
other provisions of the agreement, a contracting party shall not be
prevented from taking any measure with respect to the protection of

263. See MAl First Report Summary of Recommendations,
http://www.legis.gov.bc.caIcmtlmaill998I1reportlrecomm.htm.
264. [d. at 4.
265. See IISD, supra note 86, at 8. Also See Part V of this paper.
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health and the provision of health, education, child care, and other social
services. "266
Comments: This recommendation represents a new exception, elevating
the priority of health, education, and social services above investor
economic benefit. The author's view is that this exception will likely
never be implemented primarily because of the parties' fear of its use in
implementing hidden protectionist measures.
Modified provisions to exempt sanctions that are genuinely intended to
promote respect for and enforcement of human rights must be effectively
exempted, at all levels of government, from national treatment, mostfavored nation and any special provisions developed to deal with the
issues of "extraterritoriality" or "secondary investment boycotts."267
Comments: While this exemption is admirable from the human rights
perspective, the author's view is that this exemption has virtually no
chance of being implemented into NAFTA or any other trade agreement
any time soon. This assessment is based on the presence of the generally
narrow economic purpose for most trade agr~ements, national
sovereignty issues that are continuing to arise with every trade
agreement, and the difficulty in developing a minimum level of human
rights that all parties could agree on. The use of these exceptions to
implement hidden protectionist measures, and the difficulties in
establishing an overseeing and/or enforcement mechanism would also
likely cause major problems.
The government of Canada and all NAFTA parties should ensure the
incorporation of a narrowly defined concept of expropriation 10 any
future negotiations with the WTO.268
Comments: This suggestion doesn't address the current Chapter 11
problems. One recommendation to do this might be to modify NAFT A
Chapter 11 to include stricter language for expropriation, as the
recommendation suggests for future negotiations. The author's view is
that revising NAFT A Chapter 11 would be very difficult based on the
events leading up to NAFTA's previous ratification.

266. /d.
267. Id.
268. See Investment And Competition Policy Issues: What Canadians Are Saying, at 8;
http://www.parl.gc.calInfoComDoc/3 ... IT/StudieslReportsIFaitrp09123.htm.
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While much of the concern over NAFTA Chapter 11 has revolved
around its effect on environmental regulations, most of the squabble over
the NAAEC has been over the submission process itself, and whether the
process has actually worked over the last seven years. But a lack of
environmental emphasis seems evident. For example, Article 102
outlines the NAFT A objectives, including the elimination of trade
barriers, the protection of intellectual property rights, and promoting the
increase of "investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties" all of which may be considered worthy free-trade policies. But no
mention of any environmental objective is made in this provision.
Perhaps Article 1 (a) of the NAAEC should have been included in
Article 102 to promote the importance of environmental protection in the
treaty.269
Furthermore, given the slow and after-the-fact progress of the CEC
studies assessing the environmental effects of NAFTA, in retrospect,
perhaps NAFTA should have required impact and environmental effects
studies, as many have already suggested.
And lastly, including
provisions in NAFTA to assess penalties to companies violating
domestic environmental law may have curbed some corporate temptation
to circumvent these laws for economic reasons. 270
With regard to the NAAEC submission process, the CEC solicited and
received many public responses on how the submission process itself
could be improved. The public call resulted in the development of the
CEC Lessons Learned Report in April 2001, which recommended: 271
Expedited review of Article 14 and 15 submissions - striving for a 60
day Article 14( 1) and 14(2) review and a review of party responses
within an additional 60 - 90 days; allowing up to 60 days for party
responses; council authorization of the development of a factual record
within 90 days; and completion of the entire process within two years
from filing; and

269. Article 1 (a) of the NAAEC reads: "[to] foster the protection and improvement of the
environment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations."
270. The possibility of trade sanctions has also been explored for environmental and labor
abuses. However, the concern here is that trade sanctions might be used as protectionist measures.
See First North American Symposium, Closing Session, Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow, International
Institute for Economics, at http://www.cec.org/symposiumlindex.cfm. But the possibility of
assessing penalties and/or fines against abusers still appears to be on the table.
271. See CEC, supra note 50, at 13-16.
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Open, informed and reasoned decision-making - including access to the
reasons why the Council decides not to accept the Secretariat's
recommendation to develop a factual record; additional time for the
submitter to respond to any additional information referred to by a party
that is not on the original submission; and the reduction or removal of the
30-day blackout period, which currently allows the responding party to
become aware of a factual record recommendation before press inquiries
begin.
Professor KibeI has identified other important weaknesses in the
NAAEC submission process that were not addressed by the CEC
Lessons Learned Report. 272 In particular, the JPAC did not include
recommendations as to (a) the need to include findings and
recommendations in factual records; (b) the need for procedures to
remedy non-enforcement identified in factual records; and (c) the
absence of conclusions regarding the CEC Council's unchecked
authority to refuse to prepare or release factual records.273
The author proposes that the CEC specifically address the
recommendations dealing with preparation and release of factual records
as follows:
- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the
factors the CEC will consider when determining whether or not
to produce a factual record (see supra footnote 54): and
- Allow for the publication of some version of every factual
record, balancing a NAFf A party's need for confidentiality and
the public's right to be informed.
The author also proposes three recommendations that have already been
mentioned concerning the JPAC public review process:
- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the
process and factors the JPAC will consider when determining the
public review process it will follow when investigating a "public
issue" (see supra footnote 76);

272. See CEC - Comments on Lessons Learned: Citizen Submissions under Articles 14 and IS
of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Draft Report to the CEC
Council), Paul Kibel- RE: Comments On Draft of JPAC's Lessons Learned Report On Effectiveness
of NAAEC's Citizen Submission Process, supra note 139, at 6.
273. [d.
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- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the
process and factors the JPAC will consider when determining
whether or not a public issue is "relevant" to the CEC
submission process prior to submitting the issue to the CEC (see
supra footnote 71): and
- Develop, establish, and publicize standards outlining the
process and factors that the CEC will consider when determining
whether or not to address a public issue (see infra footnote 75).
Finally, since the CEC only has authority to review violations of
domestic law, a party could circumvent CEC review simply by
modifying or temporarily suspending their own domestic law. 274
Therefore, one recommendation might be to 1) add time constraints to
Article 14 (3) (a) to allow the violating party a finite amount of time to
domestically resolve the matter,27S and 2) allow the continuance of CEC
review authority regardless of suspensions in domestic law, once initial
CEC review authority has already been properly established. 276
VIII. CONCLUSION
As already described, the argument over NAFfA has continued to be
vigorous. There is little question about the NAFfA parties' economic
intent, particularly from the standpoint of trade barrier elimination and
investor protections, and there is ample economic evidence supported by
many academic studies suggesting that NAFf A has been beneficial to
the economies of all three NAFf A parties.
The NAFfA parties addressed environmental
the NAAEC, which provides for the CEC,
process, and the JPAC public review process.
parties granted strong investor provisions in
hopes of encouraging foreign investment for
economic efficiency and development.

concerns by establishing
the NAAEC submission
In addition, the NAFfA
NAFfA Chapter 11, in
the purpose of fostering

However, the overall impact of NAFf A has not been without flaws. The
NAFfA environmental provisions, which includes the NAAEC and its

274. See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY
1261 (Foundation Press 1998).
275. The author is sure this recommendation would not fly because of the NAFfA parties'
commitment to preserving national sovereignty -- something that this requirement could likely upset.
276. Given that the factual record is non-binding, the CEC's assessment of the suspension as
part of the factors evaluated in the factual record would be extremely valuable.
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submission process, have been the subject of much concern. A review of
over seven years of citizen submissions on enforcement matters and two
factual records (Le., the Cozumel Reef and BC Hydro factual records)
has resulted in recommendations for procedural improvements.
Academic studies on NAFfA environmental effects have also spawned
recent criticism, while providing initial evidence of both new and longsuspected NAFfNNAAEC weaknesses. In addition, unprecedented
investor provisions interpreted in the Chapter 11 cases have thus far
proven to be overly protective of corporate investment, extending
corporate power into the realm of public policy and national sovereignty,
without the safeguards afforded by exposure to public scrutiny and
public accountability.
In the meantime, more and more NAFf A citizens and organizations are

being galvanized by the secret and infrequent publications of NAFfA
Chapter 11 litigation, which have so far resulted in skewed results
favoring corporate actors over valid state interests. Furthermore,
evidence on the environmental effects of NAFf A - and the effectiveness
of the methods being used to address those effects - continues to mount,
sending stronger and stronger signals to the NAFf A parties on
improvements that need to be made and problems that need to be
watched.
The author believes that while economic progress sparked and
maintained by corporate investment and free trade are important to
achieving continued national growth and development, money and
factories are not the only ingredients of an equitable society prospering
in a sustainable environment. To move most effectively in this direction,
the NAFf A parties need to re-evaluate the goals of NAFfA to somehow
provide more than mushy rhetoric to each party's right and responsibility
to protect the environment, manage and conserve its resources, initiate
and establish health protection measures, and educate and provide health
care and other social services for its citizens.
From the standpoint of Chapter 11, the NAFf A instrumentation should
provide explicit, interpreted, and enumerated rights to enable the
development of these critical responsibilities, so that a NAFTA party is
not punished for aspiring to better serve its own people. NAFTA
renegotiation and/or insertion of interpretive provisions that fulfill a
more balanced NAFT A objective with more reasonable and realistic
priorities would serve the NAFT A parties well, and would make way for
a longer lasting, more beneficial, and socially viable agreement that
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substantively Improves the conditions of many more NAFf A
stakeholders.
With regard to the NAFf A environmental provlSlons, perhaps the
obvious questions to ask now are "Where do we go from here?" and
"What can be done with what have we learned?"
Certainly
environmental studies are underway, and questions are being asked about
efficiency, effectiveness, and openness from the standpoint of past,
present and future events. Some critics have argued that the CEC is no
longer the institution to deal with NAFfA environmental issues, now
that the "race to the bottom" is no longer the primary concern. 277 Yet
other commentators have suggested that even though NAFfA and the
CEC have not been perfect, much has already been accomplished - so
that these institutions should now become the starting point for a bigger
and better economically productive and environmentally sensitive
agreement.
As brought up by the environmental experts at the Next Steps Session of
the First North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages
between Trade and Environment, there are many important issues that
have yet to be explored. While many critical questions remain
unanswered, two key issues are discussed below.278
1.

Is process enough to protect the environment?

Comments: In the author's view, process is not enough to protect the
environment. A reliable process may lead to a consistent level of
environmental protection, given that the necessary tools are in place to
make needed process corrections. In terms of NAFfA, it seems clear
that a platform has now been established to identify and measure the
actual environmental effects of NAFf A (via the CEC Symposium and
the CEC Environmental Framework). Tools are also in place to improve
the overall CEC submission process and address issues arising from
NAAEC Articles 14 and 15 (via the JPAC public review process).

277. One commentator has suggested that a "blue sky" (less constrained?) organization might
now be needed.
278. Other Symposium "Next Step" questions included (l)What kind of CEC focus is required
to work within its own budget constraints? (2) What can be done to provide more funding for the
infrastructure upgrades that are necessary to protect the environment? (3) How do we better balance
public and private interests? (4) Can we focus on "Why the CEC is working?" rather than "Why the
CEC is not working?" and (5) how can we parse economic and environmental protectionism?
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Given that reviews could be implemented to determine whether this
process itself is being followed (perhaps this type of review could be
done at the newly-formed CEC Symposium or some other meeting done
at appropriate frequencies), this could lead to a consistent level of
environmental protection constrained by at least two major limitations.
One limitation discussed previously is that the primary objective of the
NAAEC is not to protect the environment, but to maximize the
enforcement of environmental regulations. This objective creates an
inherent discrepancy between the CEC's quest posed by this question to
protect the environment, and the NAAEC's fundamental design.
Secondly, the weak enforcement tools established by the NAAEC
available to the CEC are misaligned to handle environmental harm
because of this discrepancy. Therefore, in summary, the overall CEC
process could be optimized to identify NAFTA effects on the
environment, and to set in place a process improvement mechanism that
would protect the environment only so far. However, the CEC does not
have adequate powers to initiate the changes within the domain of the
NAFTA parties that could most effectively be used to protect the
environment.
2.

How do we move from studies to policy?

Comments: The CEC was not established to create policy. Therefore,
perhaps the better question is "How can we move from studies to
influencing policy?" One school of thought is that since the NAFTA
studies provide some evidence of environmental damage, policy changes
must be made now to stop future harm that could be irreversible.
Alternatively, another school of thought is that this fIrst round of CEC
studies is not conclusive enough, and provides little evidence of the
extent of many of these environmental problems. Therefore, it is best to
wait until more conclusive evidence is gathered.
Since the CEC has no policy-makjng authority, it must play the role of an
effective advocate. In the author's view, the CEC needs to continue to
produce consistent, scientifIc, and reliable environmental studies, along
with objective, environmentally sensitive, non-political, and conclusiondrawing factual records, to most effectively influence the NAFTA parties
to make the necessary environmental policy changes identifIed by the
CEC in order to optimize the protection of the environment.
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The complexity of the issues discussed in this paper illustrates more than
anything else that perhaps the most important ingredient required to
solve the NAFfA environmental dilemma will be the continued
cooperation and support of the NAFf A parties and citizens themselves.
But even more importantly, environmentally focused regional and global
cooperation will be required to save this earth for the living creatures and
human beings yet to be born.
Some wise words still resonate to this day from Job 12:8, even though
they were written thousands of years ago - that we must forever "Speak
to the earth, and it will teach thee." With the destiny of the environment
in our hands, man continues to speak loudly and profoundly with positive
and negative deeds that reflect upon our environment. But regardless of
which avenue of respect for Mother Nature we choose to take, the earth
will ultimately teach us all lessons that we, as human beings, mayor may
not be able to endure.
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